have included in our comparative statement the three remaining Dutch frigates ; and then, in all the items except the first, that statement would have shewn an exact equality of force. But, if even there was a slight superiority on the part of Admiral Duncan, the battle of Camperdown, as a fleet-action, possessed the merit of being (to use the emphatic language of the Broughtonian school) the second stand-up fight of the war.

Admiral de Winter, it will be recollected, in the account he transmitted to the Batavian government, and a copy of which appeared in all the London journals, attributed his failure to four causes : first, the numerical superiority of the British as to ships of the line ; secondly, their having been at sea together for 19 weeks, and hence become known to each other ; thirdly, the advantage of the attack ; and fourthly, the early retreat of six of his ships, and the bad sailing of four of those that remained. And he concludes with expressing a belief that, had his signals been obeyed and executed, with the same promptitude that Admiral Duncan's were, some of the British fleet would have reached the Texel, "as a memento of Batavian prowess, and a monument to the memory of the 11th of October, 1797."

Had the Dutch admiral wished to afford an additional cause of triumph to his adversary, he could not have succeeded better, than by inviting a discussion on the very points, on which he seems so confidently to rely for producing an opposite result. If Admiral De Winter withdraws the Mars from his line, because she passed for a frigate, why may not Admiral Duncan leave out the Adamant and Isis, which also were not strictly line-of-battle ships ; and neither of which equalled by a third, the Mars in force ? The numbers then would be, 14 English and 15 Dutch. So far from the British ships having been "nineteen weeks together," many of them had but recently joined; and some, as appeared on Captain Williamson's court-martial, were actually unknown to others of them in the fleet. Was it an "advantage," while bearing down to the attack, to be exposed to the raking fire of the Dutch line? It is true that the Dutch ships bravely withheld their fire, until their adversaries were quite near ; but the British ships had no right to calculate on such forbearance. Was it an "advantage" to be unexpectedly assailed by a second line, formed of nine frigates, heavy corvettes, and brigs, drawn up in the rear ? Unexpectedly, we say, because it is not customary for frigates to fire; or, while they remain neuter, to be fired at.

Although none of the British ships "retreated," some of them, without doubt, were backward in advancing ; otherwise, a part, if not the whole of those six ships, of whose misbehaviour Admiral De Winter complains, might have been stopped in their flight. It was owing chiefly to the " bad sailing " of several of Admiral Duncan's ships, that the onset was so irregular ; and that any of the British ships, as was the case with several, had

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