but, for the want of sufficient strength, or for some other reason, declined attacking it. So that, when the Heureux, at 2 p.m. on the 1st of August, made the signal for a fleet of 12 sail of the line (Alexander and Swiftsure not then seen), in the north-north-west, the French ships were still lying at single anchor, without springs on their cables, and with a great proportion of their crews on shore getting water. In an instant the men were recalled on board ; and the frigates, by the direction of the commander-in-chief, sent some of their men to augment the crews of the ships of the line. At 3 p.m. the French admiral made the signal to prepare for battle, and detached the Alerte and Railleur brigs to endeavour to decoy the advanced British ships upon the shoal off Aboukir island.

As yet but 12 two-deckers and a brig had made their appearance, and one of the former, from her comparative smallness, might be a hospital or store ship. At 4 p.m., however, two large ships, coming up under a press of sail, hove in sight over Aboukir point near the castle ; thus convincing the French, if they had doubted it before, that the British were at least equal to them in force. The course of the British fleet and the rapidity of its approach indicating an immediate attack, Admiral Brueys ordered his ships to cross topgallant yards, as if intending to get under way ; but shortly afterwards, observing some of the advanced British ships bring to, he appears to have adopted an idea, that the British would defer the attack until the next morning, when the shoals might be more easily avoided he thereupon signalled, that he should remain at anchor. This change of plan was afterwards attributed, by some of the French writers, to a belief on the part of Vice-admiral Brueys, that his ships were not sufficiently manned, to fight with advantage when under sail. But the admiral's expressed opinion of the impracticability of the attack on that night was notorious ; and it was equally well understood, that he only waited for darkness, to weigh and put to sea, with the intention, in compliance with the orders he had received from Buonaparte, of endeavouring to effect his escape.

If Admiral Brueys, as we have no doubt was the case, did come to the conclusion, that the British would wait till morning before they attacked him, he was soon undeceived, and then ordered each ship to lay out an anchor in the south-south-east, and to send a stream-cable to the ship next astern of her, making a hawser fast to it, in such a manner as to spring her broadside towards the enemy.* This measure was rendered the more necessary by the state of the wind, which blew from north-north-west, instead of north-west, the direction of the line formed by the six van-ships. Let us now see what preparatory

* Victoires et Conquêtes, tome ix., p. 89.

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