342 BRITISH AND FRANCO-SPANISH FLEETS 1805

hurry. ' " The compilers of the anecdote, unfortunately, have omitted the dates, both of the last entry in the log-book, and of the day of which the wreck was fallen in with. We might otherwise have been able to show, that it was the late Liverpool privateer Mars herself, which had given rise to Lord Nelson's speculations. If so, the jackets had probably belonged to some of the Matilda's crew, and the scrap of paper been written upon by a Spaniard. Whichever way it was, the inference remained just as the vice-admiral had drawn it, that the capturing fleet had steered to the northward.

A northerly course thus appearing to have been taken by M. Villeneuve, a northerly course was taken by his ardent pursuer, but, to the latter's regret, against northerly winds and hazy weather. On the 8th of August the wind became more favourable. On the 12th the Niobe frigate joined from the Channel fleet, but, strange to say, still without intelligence On the 15th Lord Nelson himself joined Admiral Cornwallis of Ushant, from whom he heard all that had happened, and, on the same evening, proceeded with the Victory and Superb to Portsmouth ; leaving the remainder of his fleet (except the Belleisle, who steered for Plymouth) as a reinforcement to the Channel fleet. * On the 18th the Victory and Superb anchored at Spithead ; and Lord Nelson shortly afterwards struck his flag and went on shore.

* See p. 302.

No. 1. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

344 APPENDIX

No. 2. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Dutch navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

APPENDIX 345

No. 3. See p. 2.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

No. 4. See p. 2.

An abstract of French, Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line and frigates, captured, &c. during the year 1799.

346 APPENDIX

No. 5. See p. 2.

A list of ships and vessels late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1799.

ABSTRACT

No 6 P 3

348 APPENDIX

No. 7. See p. 4.

Paris, le 5 nivose an viii de la république.                     

Bonaparte, premier consul de la république française, à sa majesté le roi de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande.

Appelé par le vœu de la nation française à occuper la première magistrature de la république, je crois convenable, en entrant en charge, d'en faire directement part à votre majesté.

La guerre qui, depuis huit ans, ravage les quatre parties du monde, doit-elle être éternelle ? nest-il donc aucun moyen de s'entendre ?

Comment les deux nations les plus éclairées de l'Europe, puissantes et fortes plus que ne l'exigent leur sûreté et leur indépendance, peuvent-elles sacrifier à des idées de vaine grandeur le bien du commerce, la prosperity intérieure, le bonheur des families ? comment ne sentent-elles pas que la paix est le premier des besoins comme la première des gloires?

Ces sentimens ne peuvent pas être étrangers au cœur de votre majesté, qui gouverne une nation libre, et dans le seul but de la rendre heureuse.

Votre majesté ne verra dans cette ouverture que mon désir sincère de contribuer efficacement, pour la seconde fois, a la pacification générale, par une démarche prompte, toute de confiance, et dégagée de ces formes qui nécessaires peut-être pour déguiser la dépendance des états faibles, ne décèlent dans les états forts que le désir de se tromper.

La France, l'Angleterre, par l'abus de leurs forces, peuvent long-temps encore pour le malheur de tons les peuples, en retarder l'épuisement ; mais, j'ose le dire, le sort de toutes les nations civilisées est attaché à la fin d'une guerre qui embrase le monde entier.

No. 8. See p. 62.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800.

No Dutch ship of war as high as a 24-gun corvette, captured, &c. during the year 1800.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800.

350 APPENDIX.

No. 9. See p. 62

A list of ships and vessels, late belonging to the British navy, captured destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1800

APPENDIX 351

No. 11. See p. 112.

Je proposai de conduire l'armée navale de la république à Lisbonne, de mouiller l'armée devant cette capitale, à une portée de fusil de la ville et du palais du roi ; de la faire précéder par une frégate parlementaire, qui annoncerait que l'armée de la république ne vient pas pour nuire aux Portugais, quoiqu'allíes et esclaves de l'Angleterre ; mais qu'elle vient pour exiger que tous les magasins et vaisseaux anglais lui soient livrés sur-le-champ, sous peine de raser la vine de fond en comble. Cette opération procurait à la France 200 millions en numéraire ou en marchandises anglaises ; l'Angleterre recevait un échec terrible, qui y causait et des banqueroutes et une désolation générale. Notre armée, sans être fatiguée de la mer, revenait à Brest, comblée de richesses, couverte de gloire, et la France étonnait encore l'Europe par un nouveau triomphe. -Relation des Combats, &c. par Kerguelen, p. 373.

352 APPENDIX.

No. 12. See p. 131

A quatre heures du matin, il aperçut dans ses eaux quatre bâtimens, qu'il reconnut pour ennemis : c'était en effet une partie de l'escadre anglaise : le César, monté par l'amiral Saumarez, le Vénérable, le Superbe et la frégate la Tamise. Le brave Troude se disposa au combat et renforça ses batteries par lei hommes des gaillards. Il fat joint d'abord par le Vénérable et la Tamise: le premier envoya sa volée par la hanche de babord, et le Formidable arriva pour serrer cet adversaire au feu : le combat le plus vif s'engagea vergue à vergue, et souvent à longueur d'écouvillon. Le capitaine français ordonna de mettre jusqu'à trois boulets dans chaque canon. La Tamise le battait en poupe ; mais ses canons de retraite ripostaient à ce feu. Les deux autres vaisseaux ennemis arrivèrent successivement, et, ne pouvant doubler le Formidable au vent, ils prirent position par sa hanche de babord. Les premières volées du vaisseau français démâtèrent le Vénérable de son perroquet de fougue, et bientôt après de son grand mât : l'anglais laissa arriver ; mais Troude le suivit dans ce mouvement pour le battre en poupe, en même temps qu'il faisait canonner le César, qui, se trouvant de l'avant du Vénérable, ne pouvait riposter : pas un boulet français n'était perdu. Dans cette position, le Vénérable perdit encore son mât de misaine. Troude fit diriger ensuite tout son feu sur le César, le serrant le plus près possible ; après demi-heure d'engagement, quoique l'anglais, qui avait toutes ses voiles, dépassât le Formidable, et forçât celui-ci à manœuvrer pour le tenir par son travers, le César abandonna la partie, arriva en désordre, prit lei amures à babord, et rejoignit le Vénérable, auquel la Tamise portait des secours. Il restait encore à combattre le Superbe, qui était par la joue de babord du vaisseau français ; mais l'anglais laissa arriver, passa sous le vent au Formidable, hors de portée, et rejoignit les autres bâtimens. A sept heures du matin, le capitaine Troude était maître du champ de bataille. Il fit monter dans les batteries le reste des boulets, qui pouvaient lui faire tenir encore une heure de combat, rafrachir le vaillant équipage qui l'avait si bien secondé, et réparer son gréement ; ses voiles étaient en lambeaux ; la brise de terre avait cessé, et il se trouvait en calme, à portée de canon de l'escadre ennemie, dont lei embarcations étaient alors occupées à secourir le Vénérable. Ce vaisseau avait encore démâté de son mât d'artimon, et les courans le portaient à la côte. A dix heures, le vent ayant fraîchi, la Tamise essaya de prendre ce même vaisseau à la remorque ; mais, ne pouvant se relever, il fut s'échouer entre l'île de Léon et la pointe Saint-Roch, à deux ou trois lieues de Cadix. - Victoires et Conquêtes, tome xiv., p. 168.

APPENDIX 353

>No. 13. See p. 163

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy, captured destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

APPENDIX

No. 14. See p. 163

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Spanish navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

No. 15. See p. 163

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the Danish navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801.

These are the only vessels of the 13 taken, sunk, and destroyed off Copenhagen, that can be considered as ships of war : the remainder were mere floating batteries.

An abstract of French, Danish, and Spanish ships of the line and frigates, captured, &c. during the year 1801

APPENDIX 355

No. 16. See p. 163.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the British navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1801

No. 17 bis. See p. 165

RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT

Showing the number of French, Dutch, Spanish, and Danish ships of the line and frigates, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, and accidentally burnt during the war commencing in February, 1793 and ending in October 1801 ; also the number of captured ships added to the British navy during the same period.

358 APPENDIX

No. 18. See p. 166.

RECAPITULATORY ABSTRACT,

Showing the number of British ships and vessels of war captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered or accidentally burnt during the war commencing in February, 1793, and ending in October, 1801 ; with the foundered vessels divided into British and foreign built:

Of the eight foundered British-built vessels, one, the Malabar, had been an East-Indiaman. Seven of the others were sloops, the largest of which did not exceed 324 tons ; and it is even doubtful whether three of those were not wrecked. The remaining vessel was the Leda frigate; which vessel, according to one account, upset in a heavy squall, according to another account, struck on a sunken rock, and, according to a third, filled in consequence of having her side stove by some of her guns that had broken loose in a severe gale of wind : in fact, the fate of the Leda is still involved in mystery.

No. 19. See p. 174

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the British navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1802.

APPENDIX 359

No. 20. See p. 175

No. 21. See p. 176.

French line-of-battle force in March, 1803.

360 APPENDIX

No. 22. See p. 176

Instruction partictilère du premier Consul au général de division Decaen, capitaine-général des établissemens français au delà du cap de Bonne Espérance.

Indépendamment des instructions générales quo le ministre donnera au capitaine-général des possessions françaises dans les Indes, et à l'amiral, l'un et l'autre auront des instructions d'un ordre supérieur, lesquelles seront signées par le premier consul.

Il faudra donc ôter des deux instructions ci-jointes tout ce qui a rapport à la haute politique et à la direction des forces militaires ; ce qui se réduit à retrancher quelques paragraphes. Les instructions particulières seraient rédigées ainsi :- " Le ministre de la marine a dû remettre au capitaine-général des instructions sur l'administration et les différens droits et prérogatives dont nos établissemens et notre commerce doivent jouir aux Indes ; mais le premier consul a cru devoir signer lui-même toutes les instructions servant de base à la direction politique et militaire. Le capitaine-général arrivera dans un pays où nos rivaux dominent mais où ils pèsent aussi sur tous les peuples de ces vastes contrées. Il doit donc s'attacher à ne leur donner aucun sujet d'alarme, aucun sujet de querelle et à dissimuler le plus possible. Il doit s'en tenir aux relations indispensables pour la sûreté et l'approvisionnement de nos établissemens, et dans les relations qu'il aura avec les peuples ou les princes qui supportent le plus impatiemment le joug anglais, il s'etudiera à ne mettre aucune affectation, à ne leur donner aucune inquiétude. Ils sont les tyrans des Indes ; ils y sont inquiets et jaloux, il faut s'y comporter avec douceur, dissimulation et simplicité.

" Six mois après son arrivée aux Indes, le capitaine-général expédiera en France, porteur de sec dépêches, un des officiers ayant le plus sa confiance, pour faire connaître en grand détail tout ce qu'il a connu de la force, situation et disposition d'esprit des différens peuples des Indes, ainsi que de la force et de la situation des différens établissemens anglais. Il fera connaître ses vues et les espérances qu'il aurait de trouver de l'appui en cas de guerre, pour pouvoir so maintenir dans le presqu'ile, en faisant connaître la quantité et qualité de troupes, d'armemens et d'approvisionnemens dont il aurait besoin pour nourrir la guerre pendant plusieurs campagnes au centre des Indes. Il doit porter la plus grande attention dans toutes les phrases de son Mémoire, parce que toutes seront pesées et pourront servir à décider, dans des circonstances imprévues, la marche et la politique du gouvernement. Pour nourrir la guerre aux Indes plusieurs campagnes, il faut raisonner dans l'hypothèse que nous ne serions pas maîtres des mers et quo nous aurions à espérer peu de secours considérables. II paraîtrait difficile qu'avec un corps d'armée on pût long-temps résister aux forces considérables que peuvent opposer les Anglais, sans alliances et sans une place servant de point d'appui, où dans un cas extrême on pût capituler et se trouver encore maître de se faire transporter en France ou à I'lle-de-France avec armes et bagages, sans être prisonniers, et sans compromettre l'honneur et un corps considérable de Français.

Un point d'appui doit avoir le caractère d'être fortifié, et d'avoir une rade ou un port où des frégates ou des vaisseaux de commerce soient a l'abri d'une force supérieure. Quelle que soit la nation à laquelle appartienne cette place, portugaise, hollandaise, ou anglaise, le premier projet paraît devoir

APPENDIX 361

tendre à s'en emparer des les premiers mois, en calculant sur l'effet de l'arrivée d'une force européenne inattendue et incalculée. Après avoir fait un plan d'alliance et de guerre avec une force demandée, il faudrait établir ce que croirait devoir faire le capitaine-général, si, au lieu de cette force, on ne lui en envoyait que la moitié. Après avoir pensé aux alliances et à un point d'appui, les objets qui intéressent le plus une armée dans une campagne, sont les vivres et les munitions de guerre, objets que le capitaine-général traitera également dans le plus grand détail. Six mois après cet envoi, le capitaine-général, dans un nouveau Mémoire, traitera les mêmes questions, en y ajoutant les nouvelles connaissances qu'il aura pu acquérir.

" Ainsi, il sera établi que tous les six mois le capitaine-général enverra en France des offciers sûrs, des Mémoires traitant toujours les mêmes questions, et confirmant, modifiant ou contre-disant les idées des Mémoires précédens. Si la guerre venait à se déclarer entre la France et l'Angleterre avant le 1er vendémiaire an XIII, et que le capitaine-général en fût prévenu avant de recevoir les ordres gouvernement, il a carte blanche, est autorisé à se reployer sur I'lle-de-France et le Cap, ou à rester dans la presqu'ile, selon les circonstances où il se trouvera, et les espérances qu'il pourrait concevoir, sans cependant exposer notre corps de troupes à une capitulation honteuse, et nos armes à jouer un rôle qui ajouterait à notre discrédit aux Indes, et sans diminuer, par l'anéantissement de nos forces, la résistance que peut présenter I'lle-de-France en s'y reployant. On ne conçoit pas aujourd'hui que nous puissions avoir le guerre avec l'Angleterre, sans y entraîner la Hollande. Un des premiers soins du capitaine-général sera de s'assurer de la situation des établissemens hollandais, portugais, espagnols, et des ressources qu'ils pourraient offrir.

" La mission du capitaine-général est d'abord une mission d'observation sous les rapports politique et militaire, avec le peu de forces qu'il mène et une occupation de comptoirs pour notre commerce ; mais la premier consul, bien instruit par lui et par l'exécution ponctuelle des instructions qui précedent, pourra pout-être le mettre à même d'acquérir un jour la grande gloire qui prolonge la mémoire des hommes au-delà de la durée des siècles." Précis des Evènemens, tome xi., p. 189.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the French navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1803.

No Dutch ship of war above an 18-gun corvette captured, &c. in 1803.

An abstract of French, ships of the line and frigates, captured, &c. during the year 1803

APPENDIX 363

No. 24. See p. 214.

A list of ships of the line and frigates, late belonging to the British navy captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1803.

APPENDIX

ABSTRACT

No. 26. See p. 238.

Abord du Bucentaure en rade du Toulon,le 26 prairial, an 12.        

Général,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte de la sortie de toute l'escadre à mes ordres. Sur l'avis que j'avais reçu que plusieurs corsairs anglais infestaient la côte et les îles d'Hières, je donnai l'ordre, il y a trois jours, aux frégates l'Incorruptible et la Syrène, et le brick le Furet, de ce rendre dans la baie d'Hières. Le vents d'est les ayant contrariées, elles mouillèrent sous le château de Porqueroles. Hier matin, les ennemis en eurent connaissance. Vers midi, ils détachèrent deux frégates et un vaisseau, qui entrèrent par la grande passe, dans l'intention de couper la retraite à nos frégates. Du moment où je m'aperçus de sa manœuvre, je fis signal d'appareiller à toute l'escadre ; ce qui fut exécuté. En 14 minutes, tout était sous voiles, et je fis porter sur l'ennemi pour lui couper le chemin de la petite passe, et dans le dessein de l'y suivre s'il avait tenté d'y passer ; mais l'amiral anglais ne tarda pas à renoncer à son projet, rappela son vaisseau et ses deux frégates engagés dans l'iles, et prit chasse. Je l'ai poursuivi jusqu'à la nuit : il courait au sud-est. Le matin, au jour, je n'en ai eu aucune connaissance.

Je vous salue avec respect,

LA TOUCHE-TREVILLE.

APPENDIX 365

No. 27. See p. 249.

" Si la contenance des ennemis pendant le jour n'avait été qu'une ruse ayant pour but de nous en imposer, pour cacher leur faiblesse, ils auraient pu profiter de l'obscurité de la nuit pour tenter de nous dérober leur marche et dans cette occasion je pus profiter avec avantage de leur manœuvres. Mais je pus bientôt me convaincre que cette sécurité n'avait point été simulée ; trois de leurs vaisseaux eurent constamment leurs feux allumées, et la flotte conserva la panne tout la nuit, en se tenant bien ralliée. Cette position me facilita les moyens de lui gagner le vent et de l'observer de près."

No. 28. See p. 250.

" Le vaisseau ennemi le plus avancé (the Royal George) ayant éprouvé quelques avaries, laissa arriver ; mais, soutenu par ceux qui la suivaient, il prêta de nouveau côté, et fit, ainsi que les autres bâtimens, un feu très-nourri. Les vaisseaux qui avaient viré se réunirent à ceux qui nous combattaient, et trois de ceux qui avaient des premiers pris part à l'action, manœuvraient pour nous doubler à l'arrière, tandis que le reste de la flotte, se couvrant de voile, et laissant arriver, annonçait le projet de nous envelopper. Les ennemis, par cette manœuvre, auraient rendu ma position très-dangereuse; la supériorité de leurs forces était reconnue, et je n'avais plus à délibérer sur le parti que je devais prendre pour éviter les suites funestes d'un engagement inégal ; profitant de la fumée qui m'enveloppait, je virai lof-pour-lof pour venir sur babord, et courant à l'est-nord-est, je m'eloignai de l'ennemi, qui continua à poursuivre la division jusqu'a trois heures, en lui envoyant plusieurs bordées sans effet. "

No. 29. See p. 297.

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the Dutch navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804:

No French ship of the line or frigate captured, &c. in 1804.

APPENDIX

No. 30. See p. 297

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the Spanish navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804:

An abstract of Dutch, and Spanish ships of the line and frigates,

captured, &c. during the year 1804

A list of ships of the line and frigates late belonging to the British navy, captured, destroyed, wrecked, foundered, or accidentally burnt, during the year 1804

APPENDIX 369

No. 33. See p. 301.

Faites mettre dans les journaux de Hollande un article contre le système de blocus ; faites-y sentir que nous sommes sortis de Brest quand nous l'avons voulu ; que Bruix est sorts tel jour, Morard de Galles tel jour Gantheaume tant de fois ; que dans sa dernière sortie à Bertheaume, rien ne l'empêchait de sortir, et que l'escadre le savait tellement qu'elle mit à la voile; qu'il est donc impossible de bloquer le port de Brest, surtout aux mois de septembre et d'octobre. Cet article fera sentir que nous ne voulons pas sortir, mais tenir l'ennemi en échec. Précis des Evènemens, tome xi., p. 271.

The following table will show the state of the flotilla at the different port, on July 20, 1805, with the number of men and horses it was destined to carry.

The two totals marked * do not quite agree with the items ; but, as it is, impossible, without the originals, to discover where the error lies, and as the difference is not at all material the figures have been left as they appear in the work that contains the table, whence this has been extracted. See Précis des Evènemens, tome xii., p. 304.

370 APPENDIX

No. 35. See p. 320.

A l'époque où j'écrivais ce passage, j'ignorais un fait bien remarquable et qui mérite de prendre place dans l'histoire. J'en dois la connaissance à M. le comte Daru, dont nous avons déjà cité la savante Histoire de Venise. En 1805, M. Daru était à Boulogne, intendant général de l'armee. Un matin l'empereur le fait appeler dans son cabinet. Daru l'y trouve transporté de colère, parcourant à grands pas son appartement, et ne rompant un morne silence que par des exclamations brusques et courtes . . . .Quelle marine!... Quel amiral!. . . .Quels sacrifices perdus ! . . . .Mon espoir est déçu ! . . . .Ce Villeneuve ; Au lieu d'être dans la Manche, il vient d'entrer au Férol ! . . . C'en est fait ! Il y sera bloqué. - Daru, mettez-vous là, écoutez et écrivez. L'empereur avait reçu de grand matin la nouvelle de l'arrivée de Villeneuve dans un port d'Espagne ; il avait vu sur-le-champ la conquête de l'Angleterre avortée ; les immenses dépenses de la flotte et de la flottille perdues pour long-temps, pour toujours pent-être! Alors, dans l'emportement d'une fureur qui ne permet pas même aux autres hommes de conserver leur jugement, il avait pris l'une des résolutions les plus hardies, et tracé l'un des plans de campagne les plus admirables qu'aucun conquerant ait pu concevoir à loisir et de sang-froid. Sans hésiter, sans s'arrêter, il dicte en entier le plan de la campagne d'Austerlitz, le départ de tous les corps d'armee, depuis le Hanovre et la Hollande jusqu'aux confins de l'ouest et du sud de la France. L'ordre des marches, leur durée, les lieux de convergence et de réunion des colonnes; les enlèvemens par surprise et les attaques de vive force, les mouvemens divers de l'ennemi, tout est prévu : la victoire est assurée dans toutes les hypothèses. Telle était la justesse et la vaste prévoyance de ce plan, que, sur une ligne de départ de deux cents lieues, des lignes d'opérations de trois cents lieues de longueur furent suivies d'après les indications primitives, jour par jour, et lieu par lieu, jusqu'à Munich. Au-delà de cette capitale, les époques seules éprouvèrent quelques altérations ; mais les lieux furent atteints et l'ensemble du plan fut couronné d'un succès complet. Tel était done le talent militaire de cet homme, aussi redoutable à ses ennemis par la puissance de son génie, qu'à ses concitoyens par la force de son despotisme ! ; Voyages dans la Grande Bretagne, Force Navale, tome i., p. 244.

APPENDIX 371

No. 36. See. p. 334.

LORD NELSON'S PLAN OF ATTACK.

" The business of an English commander-in-chief, " says his lordship, " being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle, on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean, that of laying his ships close on board those of the enemy as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), I am sensible, beyond this object, it is not necessary I should say a word, being fully assured, that the admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals ; which may, if extended beyond these objects, either be misunderstood, or, if waited for, very probably, from various causes, be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state, in as few words as possible, the various modes by which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object, on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and, with it, that of all Europe, from French tyranny and oppression.

" If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manœuvring is necessary. The less the better ; a day is soon lost in that business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being to leeward, standing close upon wind on the starboard tack, and that I am nearly ahead of them, standing on the larboard tack ; of course I should weather them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate ; for, if it be a gale of wind, the manœuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet. Two modes present themselves ; one, to stand on just out of gun-shot until the van-ship of my line would be abreast of the centre-ship of the enemy, then make the signal to wear together, then bear up, engage with all our force the six or five van-ships of the enemy, passing certainly, if opportunity offered, through their line. This would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive ; the second or third rear-ships of the enemy would act as they pleased, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships. The other mode would be, to stand under an easy but commanding sail, directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In that situation, I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and to cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing very close ; they being on a wind, you, going large, could cut their line when you please. The van-ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van-ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our rear-ship, and every ship in succession, wear, continue the action with either the van-ship or second-ship, as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state ; and, this mode pursued, I see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear ; and, in either case although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van-ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit ; and by that time, I believe, the battle would, from the judgment of the admirals and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from these moments are useless, when every man is disposed to do his duty. The great object is, for us to support each other, and to keep close to the enemy and to leeward of him. If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be, to engage the enemy as arriving up with them, and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c. ; giving, if possible, a close fire into the enemy in passing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention. " Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. ii., p. 427.

No. 37. See p. 340.

VICE-ADMIRAL COLLINGWOOD TO LORD NELSON.

We approached, my dear lord, with caution, not knowing whether we were to expect you or the Frenchmen first. I have always had an idea that Ireland alone was the object they have in view, and still believe that to be their ultimate destination. They will now liberate the Ferrol squadron from Calder, make the round of the Bay, and, taking the Rochefort people with them, will appear off Ushant, perhaps with thirty-four sail, there to be joined by twenty more. This appears a probable plan ; for, unless it be to bring their powerful fleets and armies to some great point of service, some rash attempt at conquest, they have only been subjecting them to chance of loss, which I do not believe the Corsican would do, without the hope of an adequate reward.

The French government never aim at little things, while great objects are in view. I have considered the invasion of Ireland as the real mark and butt of all their operations. Their flight to the West Indies was to take off the naval force, which proved the great impediment to their undertaking.

Clarke and M'Arthur's Life of Nelson, vol. ii., p. 416.

NOTES TO ANNUAL ABSTRACTS.

NOTE TO ABSTRACT No. 8.

* The hired vessels numbered about 96. It will here be seen, that the Victory has quitted her degraded post at a, to resume the rank which, for the space of 33 years, she had so honourably filled. See note a* to Abstract No. 6.

NOTE TO ABSTRACT No. 9.

* The hired vessels numbered about 104. In consequence of the mistake of a unit in the " Tons," of class t, not discovered until after Abstract No. 9 was printed, this total exceeds by 1 the corresponding total in Abstract No. 8.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 10.

W*. The purchased ship of this class was the Cornwallis, late a teak-built Indiaman.

x*. A very ancient class revived. " Advice boats so called officially, are said to have been employed, for the first time, in 1692, before the battle off Cape La Hogue in order to gain intelligence of what was passing at Brest. " See Derrick, p. 113, note *.

* As the hired vessels had begun to be discharged, they now numbered only about 62. This Abstract, having been put to press along with the one which precedes it, contains the same deficiency of a unit in the"' Tons," that is remarked upon in the single note of Abstract No. 9.

Owing to an inadvertency on our part, two 74s, one of the N, the other of the O class, that were, late in the year 1801, ordered to be built, have been left out of the " ordered" column. The addition of them will make the line numerical grand total 191, and the general numerical grand total 783.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 11.

a WITH the view to render the remaining Abstracts more perspicuous and useful a partial alteration has been made in the manner of heading them. Instead of being confined to " Cruisers," this compartment now extends to every ship fitted or about to be fitted for sea-service ; and lines are drawn to Show the totals, as well of the former, as well of the former, as of the less material portion of the Navy.

374 APPENDIX

b This head has also been slightly altered ; and in particular the " &c." has a different signification from that assigned to it in note ‡ to No. 1 Abstract. See vol. i., p. 398. It signifies that all the ships and vessels of this, as we shall call it, the second compartment which are not commissioned for harbour-service, remain in ordinary until sold or taken to pieces, a period which is sometimes extended to several years.

c The term " Built " has been substituted for " Launched, " as being more explicit, and contrasting better with " Purchased. " In the preceding Abstracts every ship down this pair of columns formed part of the " Total of Increase, " and having, in the generality of cases, been included among the " Ordered to be built " of an antecedent year, became reckoned twice over. To obviate this, a double line now excludes the built ships from the increase ; and the increase-total without any other deduction than the decrease-total may require, proves the grand total. For instance, the grand total of N, by the former method, must have been produced thus : 15 | 26032 (the corresponding total in No. 10 Abstract) + 3 | 5168 = 18 | 31200 - 1 | 1743 = 17 | 29457, instead of by simply adding the 2 | 3425.

d The " &c. " includes ships converted to sheer-hulks, breakwaters, and similar uses.

e The correction of a mistake of 50 tons in one ship (the Cornwallis, see note W* in the preceding page), occasions this total to exceed by that amount the corresponding total in the preceding Abstract.

f See last note.

g This division of the armées en flute into " Troop-ships " and " Storeships " tends to simplify the arrangement, but it was not adopted in the official register until a much later period. There, as elsewhere observed, the reduced ships, with few exceptions, ranked, until very recently, along with their full-armed classmates. The lower columns of the first compartment are now no longer in blank, the substituted term at the top admitting all ships fitted or about to be fitted " for sea-service. "

h The addition of the deficient unit remarked upon in notes' to Nos. 9 and 10 Abstracts, appears in the excess of this total over its corresponding one in the latter.

i This is merely a separation from various other classes of such stationary ships as are so registered in the official list, and might have been made a class from the first. In strictness, the three commissioned harbour-service ships at T, T, and W, and all others, which may appear in that column throughout the series, ought to belong to it : but, as the official list continue them in their original classes, we have done the same.

k The " Small Yachts," with the exception of the Medina, not being commanded by naval officers, this class has been reduced ; and the one next above it, now including the Medina, will henceforward be denominated " Royal Yachts ".

1 This being a year of peace, no hired vessels were attached to the navy. As to the grand total of " Tons, " see notes e, f, and h.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 12.

a It was remarked in note ‡ to No. 2 Abstract, that " captured vessels are also purchased from the captors before they can enter service." The union of these two columns under the head of " Purchased," subject to the distinction pointed out, claims a preference therefore, over the plan adopted in the preceding Abstracts. The names of the ships in the second column will, without the exception formerly requisite, be found in the proper list in the work ; and where, among the vessels in the first column, a purchased British merchantman rates above a gun-brig, the circumstance will be adverted to in a note.

b Late the Brave, French privateer ; presented by the merchants of Barbadoes to the British government, and on that account named Barbadoes.

c These had been British merchant vessels.

d Also these.

e The Scorpion ; built from the draught of the Cruiser. See vol. ii., p. 396, note Y*. The four British-built vessels, exclusive of these, in the " Sea service " total, are the remnant of eight, built of fir in 1795, measuring about 369 tons each, and now nearly worn out. Considering the fine qualities of the Cruiser, it is rather surprising that, during six years, three vessels only should have been built from her draught. These were launched in 1798, and were not brig, but ship rigged : consequently, they belong to class S. The Osprey, Snake, and Victor, were, however, found fault with as ships ; and all others from the same draught were thenceforward constructed as brigs. As a man of war, a ship has a decided advantage, in action, over a brig. A ship will lie to more closely, and, if she loses her mizenmast or spanker, has still a trysail on the mainmast ; whereas, the moment a brig has her gaff or main boom shot away, she loses the use of her boom mainsail, and is no longer manageable. It may, however, be said on the behalf of brig-rigged vessels that many of their apparent faults arise from an improper mode of handling them.

f These, also, had been British merchant vessels.

g The hired vessels numbered about 34.

NOTES TO ABSTRACT No. 13.

a The Hibernia ; ordered in 1790, and intended to be of the same tonnage as the Ville-de-Paris, but afterwards lengthened eleven feet. Began building November, 1792 ; launched November 17, 1804.

b The Namur ; reduced from a 90 to a 74 gun-ship, under the direction of Mr. Robert Seppings, the master-builder at Chatham. It having occurred to the philosophic mind of this ingenious architect, that, by not removing the solid bow in the wake of the second deck, in order to substitute the usual flimsy fabric, called the beak-head, the ship would acquire additional strength. in that part of her frame, as well as afford some protection to her crew when going end-on upon an enemy, the circular bow of the Namur was allowed to remain. The advantages of this important alteration struck every one who saw the ship when finished ; and subsequently, as we shall hereafter have occasion more fully to relate, every ship in the British navy was ordered to be constructed with a solid circular bow instead of a beak-head.

c Had been Indiamen, and were built of teak.

d The same.

e The two latest-built frigates of this class were launched in 1786, the Aquilon of 724, and the Thames of 656 tons. As the ships in general were a full third smaller than those of any French frigate-class, the class was considered not worth keeping up until the year 1804, when some newly-discovered properties in the Thames at the breaking up caused seven frigates to be laid down from the draught, one of old oak and named after herself, the remainder of fir. This was at a time, too, when scarcely a single 12-pounder frigate belonged to the French or any foreign navy. Frigates carrying 18-pounders were justly preferred, and, with the French in particular, were rapidly, increasing in number.

f Had been a British merchant vessel ; and so had every one of the 13 ships next below her in the same column.

g This will exemplify the exception to the generality of cases adverted to in note c to No. 11 Abstract. According to the method adopted previously to the date of the latter, 41 built or launched gun-brigs would have been separated from the 48 at b, and the difference, 7, have become the apparent number that had been ordered to be built. No deduction would here have been requisite towards proving the grand total : at the same time the true number ordered could only be obtained by noticing that none had been left as building in the preceding Abstract. For a case in point a reference may be made to the same class in Abstracts No. 10 and 9. Now, the " Ordered " column shows, at one view, and without any operation of figures, the precise number of ships ordered to be built within the year.

h See last note.

i These vessels were a disgrace to the British navy. They were built at Bermuda, of the pencil-cedar, measured about 78 tons, mounted four 12-pounder carronades, and were manned with 20 men and boys. In point of force, three of them, united were not more than a match for a single gunboat, as usually armed. Their very appearance as " men of war " raised a laugh at the expense of the projector. Many officers refused to take the command, of them. Others gave a decided preference to some vessels built at the same yard, to be employed as water-tanks at Jamaica. Moreover, when sent forth to cruise against the enemies of England, to " burn, sink, and destroy " all they met, these " king's schooners " were found to sail wretchedly, and proved so crank and unseaworthy, that almost every one of them that escaped capture went to the bottom with the unfortunate men on board.

k Number of hired vessels about 140.

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