frigate did, for a short time, with other ships, engage the Windsor-Castle. If, between the four 80-gun ships in the combined fleet, and the four 98-gun ships in the British, any allowance is expected for the nominal (for it is not real *) superiority of the latter, let four of the five surplusage frigates be added to the former ; which will be leaving three opposed to the British two because one of the latter, the Egyptienne, mounted 24-pounders on her main deck. When also it is considered, that, from the weight of metal, and number of men she carries, a French 74 is of greater force than a British 74, no objection on the part of the French or Spaniards, can be urged against an estimate which, grounded on the numerical line-of-battle strength on each side, fixes the ratio of force in their favour as four is to three.

With, then, the inferiority of one fourth in point of force, the British succeeded in capturing two ships out of the adverse line. If these were slow sailers and bad workers, how many slow sailers and bad workers did the British fleet contain ? If the density of the fog obstructed the French and Spaniards in their manoeuvres, what effect must it have had upon the British, to whom, in spite of all that had been urged to the contrary, so many signals were made and so few seen or understood; and who actually performed the evolution, which brought on the close action, without a signal at all ? The tacking of the Hero, for instance. Certainly, too, the fog, combined with the smoke, incommoded the British, who were to leeward, more than the French and Spaniards, who were to windward. A victory, therefore, it was that Sir Robert Calder had gained, but not a "decisive," nor a "brilliant" victory. To have made the action decisive, one way or the other, was exclusively in the power of M. Villeneuve; but he kept his wind, and the firing ceased, owing principally, if not wholly, to his having hauled out of gunshot.

It may throw some light upon the proceedings of M. Villeneuve, both in this action and generally since he last quitted Toulon, if we transcribe a portion of the instructions which, on the eve of his departure, he addressed to the captains of his fleet. "I do not," he says, "intend to go in search of the enemy : I would even avoid him in order to get to my destination ; but, should we meet him, let there be no discreditable evolution : it would dishearten our men and ensure our defeat. If the enemy be to leeward of us, having the power to adopt that evolution we please, we will form our order of battle, and bear down upon him in line abreast ; each ship to close with her natural opponent in the enemy's line, and to board him should favourable opportunity present itself. Every captain, who is not closely engaged, is not in his station, and a signal to recal him to his duty will be a stain upon his character. The frigates

* See vol. ii., p. 185

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