Some attention is now due to the party against whom all these formidable preparations are making. Among the officers of the Brest squadron, who disapproved of the forbearance of Rear-admiral Willaumez to attack the four 74s under the command of Commodore Beresford, was Captain Jacques Bergeret, already so well known to us. What ship of the squadron that officer commanded we are unable to state, as he afterwards quitted her for Paris, and the captain's names assigned to the ships in the list given at a preceding page are as they stood subsequently to the appointment of Captain Bergeret's successor.

A letter from the last-named officer to the minister of marine occasioned Rear-admiral Willaumez to be recalled. On the 16th the latter struck his flag on board the Océan, and went on shore; and on the morning of the 17th Vice-admiral Allemand hoisted his flag on board the same ship. Rear-admiral Gourdon remained as second in command; but two or three of the captains, including M. Bergeret, were superseded by others, leaving the whole as they stand in the list already referred to.

When M. Allemand joined the fleet, he found it moored in three lines at the entrance of the passage, and too far out. He ordered the ships to weigh, and, dropping lower down, anchored them in a double indented line "ligne endentée"; which may be explained by considering each point in the following figure as a ship with her broadside bearing against it: /\/\/\/\/\/; the two parallel lines of ships bore about north-north-east and south-south-west; and the ship's heads were to the northward. The van-ship of the outer line bore due south of the battery at the southern extremity of Isle d'Aix, and was distant from it about 640 yards. The two lines were about 250 yards apart, and the ships of each line from the stem of one to the head of the other a full 170 yards; thus making the distance from the stern of the rearmost ship in the outer line to the fort (reckoning each ship's length upon an average at 70 yards) 1520 yards, or nearly seven eighths of a statute mile. Each ship was moored with one cable to the north-west and another to the south-east. At about 740 yards in front of the outer line lay the three frigates Pallas, Hortense, and Indienne. The fourth frigate, the Elbe, was moored as the headmost ship in the second or inner line. The method here taken will show, without the aid of a diagram, how the different ships were stationed:

                              Indienne                     Hortense                       Pallas

Foudroyant       Varsovie       Océan       Régulus        Cassard        Calcutta

                Tonnerre      Patriote        Jemmapes         Aquilon          Tourville          Elbe

At the distance of about 110 yards in front of the line of frigates, a boom, half a mile in length, and composed of cables secured by anchors and floated by buoys, was thrown across the channel leading from Basque to Aix road, having its northern end within rather less than 1000 yards of the rocks that lie off the south-western extremity of the island. The anchors employed in mooring the boom were of the enormous weight of 5¼ English tons, and the cables 31½ English inches in diameter. For the information of such as are unacquainted with the subject it may be useful to add that the bower anchor of the Caledonia, the largest ship in the Royal Navy, weighs 4¾ tons, and that her bower cable measured in diameter, or did measure before iron ones were adopted, 25 inches. For any thing that appears in the accounts, the existence of this formidable boom was not known to the British until after the attack which we are about to relate had commenced.

The strength of the batteries that protected the anchorage has been variously stated as from 13 to 50 guns. It is probable that the number of guns did not exceed 30 ; but the greater part of these were long 36-pounders ; and there were also several mortars of the largest description in use. The island was garrisoned by 2000 troops ; but they were all conscripts and not to be relied upon. Nor was Isle d'Aix strong in any other part than that which protected the fleet. On its north-east side, or the side which fronts the bay of La Rochelle, there were only a few guns mounted, and those in bad condition and at a great distance apart. Exclusive of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, the isle of Oleron [Oléron], distant three miles and a half to the west-south-west of the citadel of Aix, contained three or four gun and mortar batteries, one of which, named Saumonard [Saumonards], could throw its shot and shells nearly within the range of the former. Besides these artificial defences, the road of Isle d'Aix had a shoal at a short distance in its rear, and another, at a somewhat greater distance, stretching along its southern extremity. The latter was named Palles, and was in several parts hard and rocky. The former was bank or bar of mud, thrown up at the mouth of the river Charente.

The arrival of the 12 fireships, on the afternoon of the 10th, leaving no doubt in the mind of M. Allemand as to the nature of the attack in contemplation, he directed the armed launches and boats of the fleet, 73 in number, to be assembled in five divisions, in order to be ready, at the close of day, to take their stations near the boom, for the purpose of boarding and towing away the fire-ships, and of engaging any British boats that might be sent down to assist the latter in their operations. Some very excellent regulations were drawn up for the guidance of these boats, as appears by a copy of them which afterwards fell into the hands of the British. The French admiral also ordered the ships of each line to strike their topmasts and get their topgallant-masts on deck, and to unbend all useless sails : the advanced frigates, however, were to keep their topmasts an-end, and to be in readiness to get under way, the instant the signal to that effect should be made. The line-of-battle ships were also directed to be prepared to land the few troops they had on board, in case any attempt should be made by the British to possess themselves of Isle of d'Aix.

On the 11th, early in the afternoon, the British admiral having completed his arrangements, the different frigates and smaller vessels moved to the stations assigned them. The Impérieuse ran down towards the inner end of the Boyart [Boyard], and came to, in nine fathoms, close to the shoal; having the north point of the Isle d'Aix bearing east, the south point south-east by east, and the centre of the French fleet south-east by south ; the latter at the distance of about two and half miles. The bearing of the Impérieuse, as taken from the French frigate Indienne, was nearly north-west, distant about a gun-shot and a half from the boom. The Aigle, Unicorn, and Pallas, anchored a short distance above, or to the north-west of the Impérieuse ; in order to receive the crews of the fire-ships on their return, to support the boats of the fleet which were to accompany the fire-ships, and to render assistance, if required, to the Impérieuse herself. The Whiting schooner, Lieutenant Henry Wildey, and the King George and Nimrod cutters, master's mates Thomas Mekeek and Edward Tapley, which had been fitted for throwing rockets, also took their stations near the Boyart [Boyard] shoal. The Ætna, the only bomb-vessel present, although four others (Fury, Hound, Thunder, and Vesuvius) had been promised, and eight would not have been one too many, placed herself to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, as near to the fort as possible in that direction, and was covered by the Indefatigable and Foxhound. The Emerald, Beagle, Dotterel, Conflict and Growler, were stationed, to make a diversion, at the east end of the island ; and the Redpole and Lyra, with lights hoisted, and properly screened from the enemy's view, were stationed, the one near the shoal to the north-west of Isle d'Aix, the other close to the Boyart [Boyard] shoal, in order to guide the fire-ships in their course to the attack. Each of these brigs was distant rather less than two miles from the extremity of the French line on her side.

The 11 British line-of-battle ships, which lay at a distance of from eight to nine miles from the French fleet, also unmoored, to be ready to co-operate, if necessary ; but, having unavoidably anchored in a strong tide-way, and the wind blowing hard from the north-west, the ships were again moored when the weather-tide made, in order to prevent them from falling on board of each other. Mr. Edward Fairfax, the master of the Caledonia, considered the distance of that ship and those around her from the enemy's anchorage to be only six miles ; but, when the French telegraphed from the citadel on Isle d'Aix, as they did every morning, they stated the distance at three leagues.

The wind, although in its direction as favourable as it could blow for the progress of the fire-ships, the whole of which had dropped to an anchorage about a mile nearer than the British fleet, was too violent to admit one part of the plan to be carried into effect, that of chaining the vessels together in divisions of four. Each fire-ship, therefore, was left to act an independent part ; and at about 8 h.30 m. p.m., the night uncommonly dark, the wind even fresher than it had been, and the tide flowing at the rate of more than two knots an hour, the Mediator, and the other fire-ships that had anchored around her, cut their cables and made sail. Of the three explosion-vessels, one was swept from the stern of the Impérieuse by one of the too early abandoned fire-ships ; and, although the crew of the explosion-vessel were on board ready to proceed, and did afterwards set fire to the fusee (sic), the fusee appears to have failed. In the mean while the remaining two, one of which was conducted by Lord Cochrane, assisted by Lieutenant William Bissell and four seamen, proceeded towards the road of Isle d'Aix. These two explosion-vessels appear to have been ignited when within less than three quarters of a mile from the French line : how near to it they exploded, and what effect the blast produced, the French themselves are the most competent to state. The effect that such machines were calculated to produce may be conceived from the manner in which they were prepared. Lord Cochrane's vessel alone contained about 1500 barrels of gunpowder, started into puncheons placed end-upward, fastened to each other by cables wound round them, and jammed together with wedges, having moistened sand rammed down between them, so as to render the whole, from stem to stern, quite solid, and thereby increase the resistance: besides which, on the top of this mass of gunpowder, lay between 300 and 400 shells charged with fuses, and nearly as many thousands of hand-grenades.

Several of the fire-ships were ignited and abandoned long before they got abreast of even the northernmost of the two vessels stationed as guides. Others, again, were admirably conducted ; especially the Mediator, the largest and most efficient of all of them. This ship, from her great weight, and the strength of the wind and tide, which had by this time increased to nearly four knots, broke the boom, and thus afforded a clear passage to the remainder of the fire-ships. So resolved was the Mediator's gallant commander to see the service he had engaged in properly executed, that himself and the officers and men who had volunteered to accompany him nearly perished with their vessel : one officer, the gunner (James Segges [Suggs]), was killed, and Captain Wooldridge, Lieutenants Nicholas Brent Clements and James Pearl, and one seamen, were blown out of the ship ; the three latter slightly, but the captain very severely, scorched. The loss sustained on board the other fire-ships appears to have been, two seamen killed belonging to the Cæsar, by the bursting of an explosion-vessel near the fire-ship, and an acting lieutenant (William Flintoft) and one seaman, who died from fatigue in the boat ; one master's mate (Richard Frances Jewers) of the Theseus, and another (John Conyers) of the Gibraltar, both scorched by powder.

The five or six officers in command of fire-ships, who, besides Captain Woollcombe, had the judgment and presence of mind to wait till the proper time before they set fire to the trains of their vessels, and among whom we can name Captains Newcome [Newcombe] of the Beaver, and Joyce of the Lyra, and Lieutenant John Cookesley of Gibraltar, were exposed to imminent danger in their endeavours to regain the advanced frigates. They had to pull against a strong tide and rough sea, which nearly swamped many of the boats ; and they were also endangered by flights of rockets, many of the latter, from having been placed in the rigging of the fire-ships, taking a direction quite different from that intended.

The boats of the fleet under the direction of Rear-admiral Stopford, had been ordered to support the fire-ships, and were assembled accordingly alongside of the Cæsar; but, judging from the boisterous state of the weather that their services would not be required, the rear-admiral did not proceed with them. He was so far correct that, although the fourth and fifth divisions of the French boats had been ordered to the boom, there to wait until 2 a.m., nearly the whole of them, owing to the strength of the wind and tide, were obliged to put back. Dark as was the night, the sky soon became illuminated by the glare of so many vast fires; and, what with the flashes of the guns from the forts and retreating ships, the flight of shells and rockets from the fire-vessels, and the reflection of the rays of light from the bright sides of the French ships in the back-ground, a scene was formed, peculiarly awful and sublime. But such was the strength of the wind at the commencement of the attack, that, in the British fleet, not even the explosions, loud as they were, could be heard. One of their early effects, however, was to lull the breeze considerably. What other effects the fire and explosion vessels produced, we shall proceed to relate, as well as we can collect the facts from the published and other accounts.

At 9.30 p.m., according to the time kept by the Indienne, a floating body at the boom, in the direction of her starboard cat-head, blew up with a tremendous explosion, but, although distant only 110 or 120 yards from the frigate, did not, as we are told, do her the slightest injury. The words of Captain Proteau in his journal are: "J'étais dans cette position, à trois encablatures et demie de mon escadre, l'amiral dans mes eaux, lorsque nous distinguâmes à 9 heures et demie, sous notre bossoir de tribord, un corps flottant à l'éstacade. L'explosion s'en fit tout-à-coup et vomit quantité de fusées artificielles, grenades, et obus, qui éclatèrent en l'air sans nous faire le moindre mal, et cependant nous n'en étions qu'à une demie-encablure." What then becomes of the statement of Mr. Fairfax, the master of Lord Gambier's fleet, that the explosion-vessel blew up at " about a mile " from the enemy? What grounds had he for fearing, that he should be blown up, instead of the enemy, when he admits that the Lyra, the vessel he was on board of, lay two cables' length to windward of the explosion-vessel, while the Indienne, who escaped unhurt, lay only half a cable to leeward of her. * In 10 minutes more, a second vessel exploded, also on the boom, and almost under the bowsprit of the Indienne. We may observe, in passing, that, although in point of absolute time the Indienne and Impérieuse differ by an hour and ten minutes, in relative time they agree exactly. This last explosion is described to have been more loud and appalling than the first, and to have covered the frigate with a shower of fire ; and yet we are not informed of any injury she sustained. It is therefore true, as Lord Gambier has stated, that " the blast of the explosion-vessels, under Lord Cochrane's immediate direction, did not take place by any means so near to the enemy's ships as his lordship had projected." * But it was not because of the fuses had been fired too early, as stated by Lord Gambier's witnesses, nor because the fuses had burnt too rapidly, as generally understood, but because the boom had interposed to stop the progress of the vessels. When the Indienne's officer on the forecastle discovered the floating body, it was already at, not advancing towards, the boom. Had this boom been away another half minute would have carried the vessel amidst the line of frigates ; and then, what would have been the effect of the blast ; that blast followed in 10 minutes by a second, which was even greater and more terrific than the first ? At 9.45 p.m., the Mediator broke through the boom, and, as well as the ships with her, was instantly fired at by the French ships, the shot of the line-of- battle ships passing between the masts of, and no doubt injuring, the frigates in advance. The latter presently cut their cables. The Hortense, making sail, passed to windward of many of the fireships, and discharged several broadsides into them. This frigate and her two consorts then retreated to the rear of the line-of-battle ships. Of these, the first boarded by a fire-vessel was the Régulus, with whom a large brig, in full combustion, is represented to have been grappled for a quarter of an hour ; and yet the French 74 escaped, as far as it appears, without any material injury, except some slight damage occasioned by running foul of the Tourville. The Océan was also grappled by a fire-ship ; the particulars of which we will give in the words of one of her own officers, as extracted from the translated copies of several intercepted letters, with a sight of which we have been favoured. " A frigate fire-ship was directing her course towards the Océan. We veered out several fathoms of our north-west cable, but the vessel was still nearing us. The Régulus had just cut her cables, and was endeavouring to get clear of a vessel which threatened to burn her. This movement of the Régulus obliged us to cut our north-west cable. We set the mizen top-sail to the mast to assist the ship ; but, as soon as we brought up by our south-east anchor, three fire-vessels made towards us. What was to be done? We were obliged to cut this cable also, hoist the foretopmast staysail, loose the foresail, and steer so as to avoid the Palles, the bank of rocks on which the Jean-Bart was lost. At 10.00 we grounded ; and immediately afterwards a fire-ship, in the height of her combustion, grappled us athwart our stern. For ten minutes that she remained in this situation, we employed every means in our power to prevent the fire from catching our ship. Our engines played upon and completely wetted the poop : with spars we hove off the fire-ship, and with axes we cut the lashings of her grapnels fastened to the end of her yards ; but the chevaux de frise [framework of spikes] on her sides held her firmly to us. In this deplorable situation we thought we must be burnt, as the flames from the fire-ship covered the whole of our poop. Two of our line-of-battle-ships, the Tonnerre and Patriote, at this time fell on board of us. The first broke her bowsprit in our starboard main rigging, and destroyed our main channels. Providence now aided us. Just as the fire-ship athwart our stern began to drive forward along our starboard side, the Tonnerre separated herself from us. Unless this had happened, the fire-ship would have fallen into the angle formed by the two ships, and would infallibly have burnt them. The fire-vessel having drifted as far forward as to be under our bowsprit, we held there some time, in order to afford time to the Tonnerre and Patriote to get out of her reach. While this fire-vessel was on board of us we let the cocks run in order to drown the magazine, but the flow of water was too slow for the purpose. We lost 50 men at least, through their zealous exertions to disengage the fire-ships : they fell into the sea and were drowned ; but our boats saved a number of others. A short time after we had so fortunately escaped being burnt, another fire-vessel was making for our starboard quarter : we fired our broadside and cut away her mainmast. This fortunately occasioned her to wear, and she passed close alongside of us. All the remainder of the night we were surrounded by vessels on fire. Our guns were constantly firing, even on English boats towing some of the fire-vessels. The one that grappled us on the poop was towed by a boat, manned with 15 or 16 men: we fired on her and obliged her to let go the tow. In this disastrous night the Cassard had five men killed and 15 mortally wounded by a shot from one of the fireships."

In the narrow escape of the French admiral's ship, as here faithfully depicted by one who was on board of her, we may form a tolerable idea of what must have been the situation of several of the others. Such, in fact, was the terror naturally inspired by the fleet of flaming bodies approaching, that every French ship, except the Foudroyant, cut or slipped her cables and went adrift. The Cassard, however, brought up again in the road, at the distance of about 500 yards ahead of the Foudroyant; who had, we believe, cut her north-west cable, and was now riding by her south-east one. By midnight the whole of the remaining 13 French ships were aground ; and the following were their situations at daylight on the 12th, as described by the French themselves.

The Océan lay in the mud at the distance of a full half mile to the east-south-east of the anchorage in Aix road. Having on board, in common with the other ships, a quantity of provisions for the supply of the colony to which she had been destined, the Océan was very deep, drawing not less perhaps than 28 or 29 feet. Hence she grounded while still in a part of Aix road, and not on the Palles shoal, as was thought to have been the case. This accounts for M. Allemand dating his official letter of the 12th "à bord du vaisseau l'Océan en rade de l'île d'Aix."

At about 500 yards to the south-west of the Océan, upon a rocky bed named Charenton, lay the Varsovie and Aquilon, and close to them, but upon somewhat better ground, the Régulus and Jemmapes. The Tonnerre, with her head to the south-east, lay, on a hard bottom about 200 yards to the eastward of the rock of Pontra, and bore north-west of Isle Madame, situated on the south-west side of the entrance to the Charente, and north-east of the isle of Enette, which forms the northern extremity of the opposite side of the same river. This ship, since 2 a.m., had thrown all her guns overboard except 10 of her 36-pounders, and had cut away her mainmast ; but nothing could save her, as she had already bilged. At some distance to the south-west of the Tonnerre, nearly on the extremity of the Palles in that direction, and close to the wreck of the Jean-Bart, lay the Calcutta, with her head to the south-east. The Calcutta first took the ground at 11.30 p.m., floated again at 1.00 a.m., and soon afterwards grounded a second time upon the rocky bottom on which she at this time lay. The Patriote and Tourville lay on the mud off Isle Madame, and at no great distance from the channel of the Charente. With respect to the four frigates, the Indienne lay about three-quarters of a mile to the eastward of the Océan, upon the mud off Pointe Aiguille, near Enette isle. The Elbe and Hortense lay upon the Fontenelles, and the Pallas upon the mud off the little fort of Barques, just at the entrance of the Charente.

All the grounded ships, especially the six on the hard part of the Palles, were more or less upon the heel ; and most of them, from the nature of the ground on which they lay, were in a very desperate situation. So that, although the fire-vessels of the British had not caused the immediate destruction of a single ship of the French fleet, they had left nearly the whole of the ships in a comparatively defenceless state ; exposed, if promptly acted upon, to an attack of a different description, an attack more conformable to the rules of regular warfare, and more congenial to what is usually the prevailing spirit on board a British fleet.

From her proximity to the scene of disaster, the Impérieuse was the first British ship to observe, and the first to communicate to the commander-in-chief, the grounded state of the French ships. The falling tide obliged the Impérieuse, at daylight, to weigh and stand out. Lord Cochrane then made the following telegraphic signals to the Caledonia, the distance of whose anchorage from the grounded ships was just 12 miles. At 5.48 a.m. "Half the fleet can destroy the enemy; seven on shore. " At 6.40 "Eleven on shore". At 7.40 "Only two afloat." At 9.30 "Enemy preparing to heave off." As soon as the tide suited, which was at 10 a.m., the Impérieuse returned and re-anchored close to Boyart [Boyard] shoal, the south part of Isle d'Aix bearing south-east by east ; which was nearly on the same spot from which the frigate and a few hours before weighed.

Immediately after the last telegraphic signal of the Impérieuse, Lord Gambier telegraphed the fleet, " Prepare with sheet and spare anchors out of stern ports, and springs ready." At 9.35 a.m. the British admiral made the signal for the fleet to weigh, but suspended the execution of that signal by making another, calling all captains on board the Caledonia. As soon as the conference was ended, the captains returned to their ships ; and at 10.45 a.m., according to the average time noted down in the logs of the different ships, the fleet got under way. At 11.30 a.m. the fleet re-anchored, in 12 or 13 fathoms' water, at the distance of three miles from the flagstaff on Isle d'Aix, and consequently of about six miles from the grounded French ships. The reason, officially assigned by the admiral, for anchoring at so great a distance was, that the wind blew fresh from the northward, and combined with strength of the flood-tide, rendered it hazardous to run into Aix road; but, according to the evidence of Captain Broughton examined at Lord Gambier's court martial, his lordship was induced to anchor so far off, because "as the enemy were on shore, he did not think it necessary to run any necessary risk of the fleet, when the object of their destruction seemed to have already obtained." * (* Minutes ..., p. 222.)

As a further proof that the British admiral, whatever may have been his original intention, had now abandoned the idea of employing the fleet to cannonade the works on Isle d'Aix, or the French ships aground on the Palles shoal, Lord Gambier did not make the customary signal for the ships to get springs on their cables, and be ready to anchor by the stern, because that signal (No. 14) began by calling upon the ships to " prepare for battle. " He therefore had recourse to the telegraph, as the only means of making the latter part of the signal without the former. The admiral did, however, direct the Ætna bomb-vessel, covered by the gun-brigs Insolent, Conflict, and Growler, to proceed towards Aix road, and take a position for bombarding the grounded French ships ; and Captain Bligh was directed to take under his orders the Valiant, Bellona, and Revenge, also the frigates and sloops, and to anchor them as close as possible to the Boyart [Boyard] shoal, to be ready to support the bomb-vessel and gun-brigs. While therefore the latter, as they had been ordered, stood on towards the road of Aix, the Valiant and her division came to anchor about a mile nearer to the grounded ships then the spot at which the Caledonia and the remainder of the line-of-battle ships were then lying.

This movement on the part of the British fleet auguring an immediate attack, the Foudroyant and Cassard, who had been since daylight getting up their topmasts, cut their cables and made sail for the Charente, the latter at 45 minutes past noon, and the former in a few minutes afterwards ; but, in attempting to ascend the river, the two ships grounded on the shoal at its entrance, very near to the castle of Fouras. In the mean time, as the tide flowed, all the ships that had previously grounded began to get upright, and their crews to exert themselves anew to float them off the bank. The water and provisions were started, many of the guns and much of the ammunition thrown overboard, and anchors laid out for warping. Since 6 a.m. the Océan had carried out a stream-anchor, with six cables. At about 2 p.m., by similar means, the Patriote, Régulus, and Jemmapes, succeeded in getting afloat, but grounded again on the muddy shoal at the entrance of the Charente. By the time it became nearly high water, the Océan also got afloat, and moved herself about 700 yards nearer to the channel of the river, where she was again stopped by the mud.

Seeing the French ships thus gradually getting beyond the reach of attack, whereby the whole object of the enterprise would be defeated, and observing, in particular, that the three nearest ships, the Calcutta, Aquilon, and Varsovie, were laying out anchors and hawsers for the purpose of effecting a similar removal, Lord Cochrane, at 1 p.m., just as the Ætna and the three gun-brigs had run just past him, got under way with the Impérieuse, who had previously hove short, and without any order or signal to that effect, dropped down towards the enemy. At 1.30 p.m. the frigate set her topsails, and stood directly for the group of grounded ships on the Palles. Conceiving, now, that no serious attack was intended to be made upon these ships, which were setting their sails to assist in forcing them off the shoal, Lord Cochrane made the signal No. 405, " The enemy's ships are getting under sail "; and in 10 minutes afterwards, or at 1.40 p.m. finding no attention paid to that, he caused to be hoisted the signal No. 378, " The enemy is superior to the chasing ship. At 1 h. 45 m. this was followed by No. 364, " The ship is in distress, and requires to be assisted immediately ". The latter was the point aimed at ; but there was no disuniting the signal without having recourse to the tedious operation of the telegraph.

At 1.50 p.m. the Impérieuse shortened sail, and fired a shot at the Calcutta; and at 2 p.m. anchored on the Palles shoal in five fathoms, veered to half a cable and kept fast the spring. Her starboard broadside being thus brought to bear upon the Calcutta's starboard quarter, the Impérieuse commenced her fire upon that ship, and occasionally, with her starboard forecastle and bow guns, upon the Varsovie and Aquilon. At 2.10 p.m., finding that the shot from the 24 and 18 pounder carronades of the Insolent, Growler, and Calcutta, were dropping outside of the Impérieuse, and that even the shot from the heavier carronades of the Beagle, which brig had since anchored rather within the line taken up by the gun-brigs, were not producing any visible effect, Lord Cochrane wished to order them to come closer in ; but, the signal making no distinction between ships and brigs, the Ætna would also feel bound to obey it, and she was in a proper situation for throwing her shells. In this emergency, the captain of the Impérieuse adopted an expedient more decisive than courteous : he ordered the maindeck guns of the frigate to be fired at, or near to, the brigs. They were so ; and the latter took the hint, and dropped down to a more effective position, but still kept outside of the Impérieuse.

At a few minutes past 2 p.m., finding that the Impérieuse was warmly engaged with the enemy's ships, Lord Gambier made the signal for the Indefatigable, then at anchor with the advanced squadron near the Boyart [Boyard] shoal, to weigh. Accordingly, at 2.15 p.m., this frigate got under way, and, agreeably to a signal to that effect, stood for the Impérieuse ; but, the wind though fair being light, and the ebb-tide making, the Indefatigable proceeded very slowly, although carrying royal and topgallant studding-sails. Shortly after the Indefatigable had weighed, the remaining frigates and smaller vessels did the same, and stood after her ; and at about 2.30 p.m. the Valiant and Revenge, by signal from the admiral, got also under way, and proceeded in the direction of the firing.

In the mean time, the Impérieuse continued engaging the Calcutta ; and at 3.20 p.m., on the near approach of the Indefatigable and other frigates, the crew of the Impérieuse cheered them. At that moment, finding that the Calcutta had ceased firing, and that the Frenchmen were abandoning her, Lord Cochrane sent a midshipman and boat's crew to take possession. At about 3.30 p.m. the Indefatigable anchored on the inner or starboard quarter of the Impérieuse, and, until hailed by Lord Cochrane and informed that the Calcutta had struck, directed her fire at the latter. The Indefatigable then turned her foremost guns upon the Varsovie; and the Aigle, Emerald, and Unicorn, presently took their stations ahead of the Indefatigable. Shortly afterwards the Valiant, Revenge, and Pallas, came up and anchored ; the last ahead of the other frigates, the Valiant close astern of the Indefatigable, and the Revenge about 600 or 800 yards to the north-east of the Impérieuse. Thus anchored with springs, in the form of a crescent, around the grounded French ships, the British ships opened upon them a heavy and destructive fire. The fire upon the Calcutta rendered it requisite to withdraw the boat of the Impérieuse, and Lord Cochrane sent others to inform the frigates that the French ship had surrendered.

Determined to show that his object in anchoring where he had was not to avoid close action, Captain Newcome [Newcombe], when he weighed, gallantly ran in between the Indefatigable and the wreck of the Jean-Bart. There dropping her anchor, the Beagle opened a heavy fire upon the grounded French ships. Finding, after a while, that his rudder was almost coming in contact with the wreck of the Jean-Bart, and that the Beagle was in considerable danger from the fire of the Indefatigable, Captain Newcome [Newcombe] got under way and made sail for the stern of the Aquilon. On arriving within pistol-shot of the French 74, the Beagle opened upon her a well-directed and destructive fire.

Having sustained the cannonade of the many ships opposed to them, without the means of using more than their stern-chase guns, the Varsovie and Aquilon, at 5.30 p.m., made the token of submission by each showing a Union Jack in her mizen chains. At this moment the Theseus, having weighed from Basque roads by a signal at 3.30 p.m., anchored between the Revenge and Valiant. At 6.00 p.m. the Tonnerre, who lay just out of range of the nearest British ship, the Revenge, was set on fire by her officers and crew, all of whom landed safe upon Isle Madame ; and at 7.30 p.m. the ship exploded. The Calcutta appears to have been set on fire by the midshipman of the Impérieuse without orders, and at about 8.30 p.m. blew up with a tremendous explosion, her hold containing an immense quantity of powder and other ordnance stores.

The only British ships that sustained any loss in this attack were the Revenge and Impérieuse. The Revenge had one seaman and two marines killed, and one lieutenant (James Garland), five seamen and nine marines wounded ; two of them mortally, and nearly the whole with contusions. The ship had her bowsprit severely wounded, a great part of her running rigging and sails cut to pieces, five planks of the quarterdeck cut through and a beam carried away ; besides which a number of shot had struck different parts of her hull. The damages in the hull, and the killed and wounded, are stated to have been caused by the fire of the batteries on Isle d'Aix, and the cut rigging by the fire of the Aquilon and Varsovie.

The loss sustained by the Impérieuse consisted of three seaman killed, her surgeon's assistant (Gilbert), purser (Mark Marsden), seven seamen, and two marines wounded. The frigate received several shot in the hull, and had her masts, rigging, and sails a good deal cut : both loss and damage principally the effects of the fire of her three antagonists on the Palles, especially of the Calcutta. The Indefatigable and Beagle, although they escaped without loss, received more or less of damage in their masts and yards from the enemy's shot. It is remarkable that, although the batteries of Isle d'Aix and of Saumonard [Saumonards] on the isle of Oleron [d'Oléron ] kept up a constant fire of shot and shells, the Revenge and Indefatigable were the only British vessels of the 14 engaged that suffered from it : the damage to the Indefatigable, indeed, was merely a wounded topmast.

With respect to the French loss in this attack, our information is not of the most certain kind. The Calcutta is described to have had her hull riddled before any assistance came to the Impérieuse, and to have lost, out of a crew of 230 men, none killed, but 12 badly wounded. The captain of the Aquilon appears to have been killed, as he was sitting by the side of Lord Cochrane in the boat of the Impérieuse, by one of the Tonnerre's guns, which accidentally went off while that ship was burning. The Aquilon's loss on board was inconsiderable, owing, as it was stated, to Captain Maingon, when he found he could not return the enemy's fire, very prudently directing his officers and men to lie down. The Varsovie lost upwards of 100 in killed and wounded together. The Océan sent her boats to save the crew of this ship, but the grape-shot from the British ships prevented the boats from getting alongside.

The discrepancies that occur in the time kept by the British ships, and our inability to remedy the evil by a reference to the minutes kept by the French ships, prevent us from applying to any very useful purpose, the following translated extract from the letter written by the officer of the Océan: " During this action (that with the grounded ships), we fired some of our guns from the stern. The flood having borne our ship[s] up for a short time, we ran her on shore a few cable's lengths further up. An English ship of the line tried to come to an anchor under our stern ; but she touched the ground, and was with great difficulty got off. Had this not happened, we should have been cannonaded in a pretty style." We cannot discover that any of the British line-of-battle ships sent into Aix road had an intention to molest the Océan: but the ship alluded to was undoubtedly the Revenge. This ship, however, did not actually take the ground : she only stirred up the mud with her keel. One fact is certain. The Océan, at the time she was thus menaced, or supposed to be menaced, with an English line-of-battle ship's raking fire, had retired from a spot nearly half a mile nearer to the British fleet : on which exposed spot the French three-decker had lain aground since long before daylight; where, for four or five hours the ship was heeling very much ; and where, in short, a couple of well-handled frigates, one on each quarter, might have nearly destroyed her.

Even after this opportunity had been lost, five French line-of-battle ships, and one frigate were still assailable, either by fire-ships, or by frigates, gun-brigs, and bomb-vessels. Those ships were the Océan, Cassard, Régulus, Jemmapes, Tourville, and Indienne, all lying aground at the mouth of the Charente. Unfortunately, there having been no reserve of fireships, the fleet was now without any, and the only bomb vessel present was the Ætna. However, three transports were hastily converted into fire-ships ; and at 5.30 p.m. Rear-admiral Stopford got under way with the Cæsar, and, accompanied by the three fire-ships, and the launches of the fleet fitted to throw Congreve rockets, stood towards Aix road, receiving from the batteries of Aix and of Oléron, a spirited but ineffectual fire. At 7.40 p.m., Isle d'Aix bearing from north to north-north-east, the Cæsar struck on what was supposed to be the south-eastern extremity of the Boyart [Boyard] shoal. As it it was nearly low water, the Cæsar did not float again until 10.30 p.m.; when she swang to the stream-anchor which had been let go. The Valiant had grounded about half an hour earlier than the Cæsar, and got afloat a few minutes later, equally without damage. Neither the Theseus nor the Revenge appear to have grounded at all. Upon weighing from her first anchorage, which she did shortly after the Theseus had brought up astern of her, the Revenge unexpectedly kept afloat, until, to the surprise of her captain, she reached a fine anchorage between the Boyard and Palles shoals, in five and quarter fathoms' water, at the dead of a spring-tide ebb, out of reach of shot or shell ; and where there was room for five or six sail of the line. It was in endeavouring to reach this anchorage, that the Valiant grounded on the edge of the Palles. The Indefatigable and Impérieuse also grounded, but got off in an hour or two without damage. At about 8 p.m. all the remaining frigates and brigs, except the Impérieuse, weighed and anchored with the Revenge at the entrance of Trousses roads.

It was very near midnight before the three fire-ships were ready to proceed. The wind then became baffling; and, at 2 a.m. on the 13th, began to blow from the south-west, or directly out of the passage to Aix road. Profiting by this circumstance, Rear-Admiral Stopford, at 2.30 a.m., got under way and made sail; and at 4 a.m. the Cæsar came to anchor in Little Basque Roads. As the fire-ships, which had been committed by the rear-admiral on his departure to the charge of Captain Bligh, could not for the present be put into operation, nothing further was done beyond setting fire to the Aquilon and Varsovie; both of which ships, it is said, had the water up to their orlop decks. Some persons have thought, however, that the Varsovie, represented to have been one of the finest two-decked ships in the world, might, with a little exertion, have been saved. But the Varsovie, as well as the Aquilon, was, by the orders of Captain Bligh, doomed to destruction.

The time occupied in removing the prisoners and their effects, made it a few minutes past 3 a.m. before the fire could be put to the two ships. At 3.30 a.m. the flames began to ascend; and not being aware that the magazines of the two ships were drowned, the Impérieuse got under way, to avoid the effects of the expected explosion : as did also the three fire-ships, which, by the orders of Captain Bligh, had removed to the anchorage of the Impérieuse, to be employed, when the time suited, under Lord Cochrane's directions. One of these, while working out, ran aground off Isle d'Aix, and remained fast; but it does not appear that the few hands on board of her were either lost or made prisoners.

The appearance of the two flaming bodies led to some extraordinary occurrences on the part of the French. They actually mistook the burning Varsovie, and Aquilon for British fire-ships ; and the Océan, Tourville, Indienne, and the others of the grounded ships opened a cannonade upon them. This was not all. The captain and crew of the Tourville were so alarmed at the seeming approach of those dreadful engines, that they abandoned their ship, without waiting to furl the sails, which had been set to force her off the shoal, or even to see that the fire, which had been put to the ship in two places, had begun to take effect. Observing at daylight from the Port-des-Barques, where he and his crew had landed, that the Tourville had neither suffered by fire from without, nor from within, and that the British line-of-battle ships and frigates were getting under way to return to Basque roads, Captain Lacaille prepared to go back to his ship. In about two hours after he had quitted her, he was again on board with, including three boats' crews that had returned from doing duty on board the Océan, about 230 officers and men, out of a crew of at least 660.

The French captain now learnt that, during his absence, a single British boat would have captured the Tourville, had it not been for the prowess of one of her quartermasters, who, unknown to M. Lacaille, had remained in the ship. We are unable to state what ship's boat it was that so nearly made a prize of the French 74; for, certainly, had the officer been aware of the abandoned state of a Tourville, a resolute attack must have been crowned with success. The following is a summary of the French quartermaster's story : His name was Eugène-Joseph Romain Bourgeois, and his age 31 years. Being resolved to stand by his ship to the last, he crept from the boat into which he had been ordered to embark, unperceived, through one of the Tourville's lower-deck ports. As soon as the boats had all pushed off, he began constructing a raft, in case the two supposed fire-vessels should grapple the Tourville; or that the fire, which had been put to the ship in two places, should take effect. He had just completed his raft, when an enemy's boat approached the Tourville. He hailed the boat twice; and, receiving no reply, fired off the musket which the sentry at the gangway had in his haste thrown down. The boat returned the fire ; but the intrepid Bourgeois was not to be so daunted : he ran to the captain's cabin, and, taking an armful of muskets from the rack, discharged 20 of them in quick succession. This had the desired effect, and the boat pulled away. After he had been aboard about an hour, he discovered, lying on the lower deck, three of his shipmates, drunk and insensible. Shortly afterwards three of the Tourville's boats arrived from on board the Océan; and a young midshipman-volunteer (aspirant de première classe), names Marinier, took the command of the 30 men now present, and made suitable preparations for defending the ship : indeed, every man of this little band is represented to have sworn to defend the Tourville to the utmost of his power.

At 5 a.m., agreeably to a signal made by Rear-admiral Stopford, Captain Bligh got under way with the Valiant, Theseus, and Revenge, and was followed by the Indefatigable, Unicorn, Aigle, and Emerald. While the Impérieuse, in her way to the anchorage she was about to take up, was passing within hail of the Indefatigable, Lord Cochrane proposed to Captain Rodd that, if the Indefatigable would go on one quarter of the Océan, the Impérieuse would take the other. Captain Rodd declined to do so; alleging as his reason, that the Indefatigable's main topmast had a shot through it, that her draught of water was too great for the service in contemplation, and that he should not be justified in acting without orders, in the presence of two superior officers, Captains Bligh and Beresford. At 6 a.m. the Impérieuse anchored in Trousse roads; and at 6.30 a.m. the Pallas passed under sail, on her way to Basque Roads after the other ships. Captain Seymour hailed the Impérieuse, to know whether or not he should remain. Lord Cochrane directed him to do so, if he, Captain Seymour, had received no orders to the contrary. The Pallas immediately anchored; and the Beagle and gun-brigs followed her example. At 8 a.m., which was as early as the tide suited, Lord Cochrane despatched the brigs and bomb-vessel to attack the nearest French ships aground at the entrance of the Charente; meaning to follow with the two frigates, if the water, which happened not be be the case, should prove sufficient. At 11 a.m. the Beagle, Ætna, Conflict, Contest, Encounter, Fervent, Growler, the rocket schooner Whiting, and the two rocket cutters Nimrod and King George, coming to anchor, opened their fire on the Océan, Régulus, and Indienne, as those ships lay aground. The Océan, during the preceding night, had landed all her boys, and the greater part of her soldiers: the faint-hearted (hommes pleureux) of her crew had also been allowed the same indulgence. This left on board just 600 officers and men, determined to defend their ship to the last extremity. Since daylight the third tier of water had been started, the shifting ballast, 100 barrels of flour, and a great quantity of salt provisions, thrown overboard; but the Océan still remained fast. The Beagle, in the most gallant manner, took a position, in 16 feet water (her draught was 12½ feet forward, and very nearly 15 abaft), upon the French three-decker's stern and quarter, and engaged her for five hours. The Océan returned the fire with her eight stern-chasers; from which, although her two poop-carronades from being overheated had upset early in the action, she is represented to have fired 260 36-pound shot, 340 24-pounders, and 380 12-pounders.

The Beagle appears to have borne the brunt of the engagement. At all events, that brig suffered more than any one of her consorts; having had her hull struck through in several places, her main yard and main topmast shot through, and her standing and running rigging very much injured. The Beagle did not, however, sustain any loss of men; none at least that has been recorded. The bomb-vessel and gun-brigs also appear to have escaped without loss, as well as without any material damage; except that the Ætna, as was now become an invariable case, had split her 13-inch mortar. At the time that the flotilla ceased firing, the Océan and Régulus, it being then high water, were preparing to push further up the Charente. At 4 p.m., the tide then falling, the Beagle and her consorts weighed and worked back to their former anchorage, exposed, during a part of the time, to a heavy fire from the batteries on Isle d'Aix; but which, nevertheless, appears not to have injured any one of the British vessels.

Among the damages sustained by the Océan in this attack, was a 32-pound shot (one of the Beagle's) right through the mizenmast to the spindle, spankerboom cut in two, six main and two mizen shrouds cut through, main topsail yard badly wounded, and two chain plates and all three topgallant yards shot away. The hull had also been struck by several shot and pieces of shell, and even the decks in many places ripped up. But, notwithstanding this heavy damage, the Océan had only one killed, a young midshipman, while standing near the admiral at the commencement of the action. M. Allemand immediately ordered all the hands, not wanted at the stern-chase guns, to go below. Owing to this wise precaution, no other life was lost, and only a few men slightly wounded. The Régulus was at too greater distance to be much annoyed by shot, especially when discharged from carronades. Three shells, however, fell on board her; and one of them went through all her decks, and burst in the hold. Her loss we are unable to state. The Indienne had only three men wounded; one with his thigh shot off. Several shot, however, are represented to have struck the frigate's masts. The Cassard, Jemmapes, and Tourville, appear likewise to have had a slight share in this engagement, but were too distant to suffer from it.

While this action was going on, the Impérieuse and Pallas lay at the anchorage, unable, from the strength and direction of the wind and the velocity of the tide, to advance with safety to the attack of the grounded ships. At noon the Dotterel, Foxhound, and Redpole, and two more rocket-vessels, from Basque roads, joined Lord Cochrane, and anchored near the two frigates. By these vessels Lord Cochrane received both a public and a private letter from Lord Gambier. The public one directs Lord Cochrane to make an attempt upon the Océan, with the bomb and rocket vessels, but expresses a strong doubt about the success of the attack. Lord Cochrane is then ordered to come to Basque roads as soon as the tide turns. The private letter states thus: "You have done your part so admirably, that I will not suffer you to tarnish it by attempting impossibilities, which I think, as those captains who have come from you, any further efforts to destroy those ships would be. You must therefore join as soon as you can with the bomb, &c., as I wish for some information which you allude to, before I close my despatches." To the first or public letter, Lord Cochrane replied: "I have just had the honour to receive your lordship's letter. We can destroy the ships which are on shore, which I hope your lordship will approve of." Either a few minutes before or after the receipt of Lord Gambier's letter, it was considered on board the Impérieuse that her signal of her recall was made by the Caledonia. The Impérieuse answered the supposed signal (for it is doubtful whether it was made), and telegraphed that the enemy could be destroyed. It was shortly after this that the Beagle, Ætna, and smaller vessels, re-anchored near the Impérieuse and Pallas.

On the 14th, at 2.30 a.m., by throwing overboard the chief part of her guns and other heavy materials, the Tourville got afloat and entered the Charente ; but, presently afterwards, through the alleged carelessness of her pilot, the ship ran on shore on the opposite side of the river, off the town of Fouras, and close to the wreck of one of the largest of the fire-ships, probably the Mediator. The Océan was equally unsuccessful in her efforts to get into the channel, and grounded on the same side of the river as the Tourville; but the Patriote, Hortense, Elbe, and Pallas were more fortunate, and ascended the Charente beyond the reach of danger.

At 9 a.m. the Impérieuse, it is admitted, was recalled by a signal from the Caledonia ; which signal also directed Lord Cochrane to communicate with Captain Wolfe of the Aigle, who had been ordered to supersede his lordship in the command of the Aix flotilla. At noon the Aigle joined the Impérieuse; and at 4.30 p.m., in compliance with the admiral's order, the latter weighed and stood towards Basque roads. On the 15th the Imperiéuse sailed for England, having on board Captain Sir Harry Neale with Lord Gambier's despatches. About an hour previous to the departure of the Impérieuse from the anchorage in Maumusson passage [Trousses roads], the Ætna and five of the brigs had proceeded to attack the Régulus, Indienne, and the other ships in their vicinity. The bombardment and cannonade continued until 7 p.m., and only ceased then because the Ætna has consumed all her 10-inch shells. Very little effect appears to have been produced on either side by this engagement. During its progress, the Jemmapes had cleared herself and run up the river.

In consequence of the strong north-west winds which had been blowing, the French expected that the tide of the 15th would be of an extraordinary height. To prepare for this, the Océan threw overboard the whole of her third deck guns, half of those on her first deck, and 4 24-pounders from her middle deck. As soon as the ship began to feel the flood-tide, a great strain was hove upon the cables which had been laid out the day before, and the driver and all the after sails were set, to bring the ship's head to the wind, which still blew strong from the north-west. At 2 a.m. the Océan felt the canvas, and got out of her bed. The head-sails were then set, the cables cut, and the French three-decker moved ahead through the mud. After forcing her through it for 500 yards, the Océan got into the fair way of the river, and at 3.30 a.m. anchored off the Points des Barques [Port-des-Barques] in perfect safety. At 4 a.m., by following the same plan as the Océan, the Cassard met with the same success. So that the only ships that remained aground at the mouth of the Charente, were the Foudroyant, Régulus, Indienne, and Tourville, the latter furthest up of any. Against these ships no effective attack could be made, even had the weather permitted, because there was no bomb-vessel in the British fleet, the Ætna having split her 13-inch mortar and used all her 10-inch shells.

On the 16th, at 10 a.m., after more than five days' exertions, highly creditable to her commander, M. Proteau, and his officers and crew, the Indienne was set on fire, and in an hour or two blew to pieces. On the 17th at 4 a.m., it being then about high water, the Foudroyant and Tourville extricated themselves and stood up the river; the latter anchoring of Pointe Vergeron, and the former a little below the Pointe des Barques [Port-des-Barques]. There now remained only the Régulus; and she lay, as already stated, on the north-east bank of the Charente, just under the town of Fouras.

The 18th and 19th passed, without any attempt to destroy this French ship. On the first day there was no bomb-vessel. On the second day the Thunder arrived, but the weather was too violent for the small vessels to co-operate with her. The officer of the Océan, whose letter we have before quoted, says, under date of the 19th of April: "We begin to despair of getting off the Régulus, which ship is still in the same situation. The enemy continue in Isle d'Aix road to the number of 20 sail. They have not made any movement whatever for these three days : which is a thing not at all to be understood (ce qui l'on ne conçoit pas bien ), for they might with ease attack the Régulus, and oblige her crew to abandon her."

On the 20th the Thunder, covered by the gun-brigs, went to attack the Régulus; but a few discharges from the former's 13-inch mortar soon reduced it to the state of the Ætna's. The 21st and 22nd appeared to have passed inactively. On the 23rd four gun-brigs took each on board two of the Aigle's long 18-pounders, and, with the two bomb-vessels (the Ætna having supplied herself with 10-inch shells from the Thunder), used every means, during the whole of the 24th, to drive the French out of the Régulus, but without success. This was the last attempt that was made ; and at daylight on the 29th the Régulus got herself afloat, and soon joined her companions at Rochefort. On the same day Admiral Lord Gambier, in the Caledonia, sailed for England ; and Basque road soon became thinned of its shipping.

Although rather a ticklish subject to handle, we shall not be deterred from submitting a few observations upon the proceedings which were carried on, for the avowed purpose of destroying the French fleet at anchor in the road of Isle d'Aix. In the first place, we ask, Is it necessary that an attack by fire-ships should take place in the night ? * It is clear that, if the officers commanding those at Basque roads had had daylight to steer by, fewer of them would have failed in their object. To destroy the French boats at the boom, one or more explosion-vessels were admirably calculated ; but, if no boats were assembled at the boom, the blast, however great, could have produced little or no effect, as is evident from the Indienne's escaping comparatively unhurt, although not above 110 yards from the vessel that exploded ahead of her. Had it not been for the accidental employment of the Mediator as a fire-ship, it is probable that the boom would have been unbroken, and then all the ships, as well as the explosion-vessels, would have expended themselves outside of it. The existence of a boom should have been presumed ; and one heavy fire-ship, or explosion-vessel if deemed preferable, should have been sent considerably ahead of the others, to break it down and open a channel for them. The remaining fire-ships, chained in twos or fours, might then have proceeded, with almost a certainty of taking effect, admitting, as we before suggested, that daylight had been the time of the operation. Another question presents itself, applicable to either a day or a night attack. Supposing the attack to have been delayed until the tide had flowed two hours more, would not the French ships have grounded upon the harder parts of the shoal, as well as the shallower at low water, and have been therefore less likely to get afloat at the return of the tide?

The next point for consideration is the attack upon the grounded ships. It must here in justice be stated, that Lord Gambier had not such an effective force in vessels of a light draught of water, as, according to the nature of the service, he ought to have been supplied with. In most navies a gun-vessel means a small vessel, carrying from one to four heavy long guns, capable, from the manner in which they are mounted, of being used on either side, and from the extent of their range, of annoying an enemy at a considerable distance ; but in the British navy a gun-vessel, or gun-brig, is a vessel that carries on her broadside five or six 18-pounder carronades, whose effective range is scarcely two-thirds that of a long gun of the same caliber Lord Gambier had five of this description of small-craft : he had also, except just as the affair ended, one, and only one bomb- vessel. This was not the kind of force which Captain Keats contemplated, when in April, 1807, he proposed attacking the French squadron at anchor in the same road. He required small vessels with long guns, and "that class which have been in the custom of throwing 8-inch shells from 68-pounder carronades. * (* Minutes ..., p.18.)

Being deficient, as he undoubtedly was, in his force of small vessels, the admiral should have been more vigorous and decisive in his attack by the larger vessels. Next to the Caledonia and Gibraltar, the Cæsar and Revenge drew the most water of any ship in Lord Gambier's fleet. What business, then, had the Cæsar and Revenge in Isle d'Aix road, while the Bellona and Resolution were lying at anchor in Basque Road ? Why was not the water from the transports, that were fitting as fire-ships, emptied into the sea, instead of being transferred to the line-of-battle ships ? Every additional half-foot the latter drew was of consequence, in the service in which they were about to be engaged. Even of the small vessels, the best use was not made. Why were the Dotterel and Foxhound, with their 32-pounder carronades, not sent into the road of Aix before the 13th? Then came ignorance of the navigation and of the shore defences, and disputes about the authenticity of charts. It was at length discovered, but too late to be of any utility, that there was room for ships to act upon a fleet in Aix road out of range of the batteries on either side ; and it was even doubted, whether the fort of Aix might not have been silenced by two or three British 74s * The remark made by the officer of the Océan may here be introduced. " The batteries of Isle d'Aix afforded us no protection at all, for the enemy forced a passage up the road with the greatest of ease. Two of our line-of-battle ships (Foudroyant and Cassard) did not think they could maintain their position at the anchorage, and ran aground under Fouras. I did not think even the flotilla (alluding to some gun-boats fitting out) can hinder ships from forcing their way into the road ; a road with which the enemy, during the 15 days he was at anchor there, made himself so well acquainted, that he went in and out as if it was one of his own harbours."

Upon his return to England, Lord Cochrane, for the gallant part he had performed, was created a knight of the Bath. He shortly afterwards intimated to the first lord of the admiralty, that he should, in his seat in parliament, oppose the passing of any vote of thanks to Lord Gambier for his conduct at Basque Roads. Lord Mulgrave communicated this to the admiral ; and Lord Gambier, being well advised on the subject, requested that a court-martial might be held upon his conduct between the 17th of March and 29th of April. The court-martial was granted ; and on the 26th of July Admirals Sir Roger Curtis and William Young, Vice-admirals Sir John Thomas Duckworth, Sir Henry Edwin Stanhope, Billy Douglas, and George Campbell, Rear-admiral John Sutton, and Captains John Irwin, Robert Hall, Edward Stirling Dickson, and Richard Dalling Dunn, assembled at Portsmouth, to try Admiral Lord Gambier upon the following charge: " And whereas, by the log-books and minutes of signals of the Caledonia, Impérieuse, and other ships employed in that service, it appears to us that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the 12th day of the said month of April, the enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed, did for a considerable time neglect or delay taking effectual measures for destroying them."

The court sat from the 26th of July to the 4th of August. The minutes of the trial are now before us ; and we cannot refrain from observing, that several of the members, particularly the president (Sir Roger Curtis) and Admiral Young, evinced a strong bias in favour of the accused. On two or three occasions, Admiral Young attempted to browbeat Lord Cochrane ; and the cross-examination of some of the witnesses, whose evidence went in support of the charge, would have done credit to a practitioner of Westminster hall. Nor must we omit to notice the singular circumstance, that Captain Maitland, of the Emerald, who had made no secret of his opinion on the character of the proceedings in Aix road, should happen, when the court-martial was about to take place, to be on the Irish station. It is true that the secretary of the admiralty informed Lord Gambier, that Captain Maitland, if his lordship desired, should be ordered to attend. But Lord Gambier, as may be supposed, did not wish to delay the trial on that account; and out of the 17 captains employed in Basque roads, with the exception of Captain Richardson of the Cæsar, Captain Maitland was the only one who was not examined as a witness on the admiral's court-martial.

Upon the whole, therefore, we are not at all surprised at the sentence which that court-martial pronounced upon Admiral Lord Gambier. The sentence was as follows: " Having heard the evidence produced in support of the charge, and by the said Right Honourable Lord Gambier in his defence, and what his lordship had to allege in support thereof; and, having maturely and deliberately weighed and considered the whole, the court is of opinion, that the charge has not been proved against the said Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier ; but that his lordship's conduct on that occasion, as well as his general conduct and proceedings as commander-in-chief of the Channel fleet in Basque roads, between the 17th day of March and the 29th day of April, 1809, was marked by zeal, judgment, ability, and an anxious attention to the welfare of His Majesty's service, and doth adjudge him to be most honourably acquitted ; and the said Admiral the Right Honorable Lord Gambier is hereby most honourably acquitted accordingly."

Lord Gambier's assertion at his trial, that the most distant French ship of the two lines was within point-blank shot of the works of Isle d'Aix, we, by giving the exact distance, have shown it to be incorrect. Equally untenable are the last two of the four points upon which his lordship rested his defence. One of those two points was: " That three out of the seven of the enemy's ships aground on the Palles were, from their first being on shore, totally out of the reach of the guns of any ships of the fleet that might have been sent in ; and that at no time whatever, either sooner or later, could they have been attacked." The other point was: " That the other four of the 11 ships of which the enemy's fleet consisted, were never in a situation to be assailed after the fire ships had failed in their main object." * To demolish the first of these grounds of justification, it is only requisite to advert to the situation, near the Calcutta, of the Régulus and Jemmapes, two of the above three ships, until 2 p.m. on the 12th * ; and the second ground gave way beneath his lordship, when the first British cannon-shot struck the Indienne, described by her commander as half a league to the eastward of the Océan, and she was the most north-eastern of all the grounded line-of-battle ships.

The neglect, or the impossibility, to send out the promised bomb-vessels contributed, undoubtedly, to mar the enterprise, but not to the extent generally supposed, because of the inefficient state of all the 13-inch mortars (chiefly from being too light, an evil since remedied) then in use in the British navy. It has been urged, that the admiralty ought to have selected officers acquainted with the navigation of Basque and Aix roads ; but it will be recollected, that, when the attack was resolved upon, a British fleet already lay at anchor in the former road, and to have substituted officers for others, who were on the spot, might have led to the inference that there was not merely a lack of information, but a lack of zeal. As it was, the appointment of Lord Cochrane, the junior of so many captains in the same fleet, to conduct the enterprise, created a jealousy, where the utmost unanimity should have prevailed. A little management and address might have effected the object, without giving offence to any one. Or the thing might have been done boldly ; and, as Lord Gambier had expressed a doubt as to the success of the plan in the contemplation of the admiralty, he should have been recalled, and another admiral, who saw no uncommon difficulty in the undertaking, have been sent to relieve him.

The opinion which Napoléon is said to have expressed, when many years afterwards questioned relative to the attack upon his fleet in the road of Aix, is contained in the following extract from a well-known English publication: "Some conversation now took place about Lord Cochrane, and the attempt which his lordship made to capture or destroy the ships in the Clarente [Charente]. I said that it was the opinion of a very distinguished naval officer whom I named, and who was well known to him, that, if Cochrane had been properly supported, he would have destroyed the whole of the French ships. ' He could not only have destroyed them, ' replied Napoléon, 'but he might and would have taken them out, had your admiral supported him as he ought to have done. For, in consequence of the signal made by L'Allemand (I think he said) to the ships to do the best in their power to save themselves, sauve qui peut in fact, they became panic-struck and cut their cables. The terror of the brûlots (fire-ships) was so great that they actually threw their powder overboard, so that they could have offered very little resistance. The French admiral was an imbécile, but yours was just as bad. I assure you that, if Cochrane had been supported, he would have taken every one of the ships. They ought not to have been alarmed by your brûlots, but fear deprived them of their senses, and they no longer knew how to act in their own defence.'" *

The destruction of three French two-deckers and a ship armed en flûte seems hardly to have warranted the Nelsonic exordium: " The Almighty's favour to His Majesty and the nation has been strongly marked," &c.,; much less the high-flown panegyric, contained in the secretary of the admiralty's letter to Lord Gambier: " I am commanded by their lordships to congratulate you on the brilliant success of the fleet under your command." And again, " Their lordships, considering that the state of the enemy's force in consequence of the brilliant success of the fleet under your command," &c. The only part of the enterprise, in which any thing of a brilliant nature discovered itself, was when the fire-ships were burning, and the explosion-vessels bursting through the air ; unless, giving to the term its intended metaphoric allusion, it was when Captain Wooldridge, in the Mediator, broke the boom, and, above all, when Lord Cochrane, in the Impérieuse, dashed in, without orders, and attacked the grounded line-of-battle of ships.

In the Lords, the thanks of the House were voted to Lord Gambier upon the motion of Lord Mulgrave, with a few dissentients, but without a division. In the House of Commons, Lord Cochrane moved for a copy of the minutes of the trial of Lord Gambier, but lost his motion by the success of the amendment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that " sentence" might be substituted for " minutes". Mr. Percival then moved, " That the thanks of the House be given to Admiral the Right Honourable Lord Gambier, for the zeal, judgment, ability, and anxious attention to the welfare of His Majesty's service, which marked his lordship's conduct as commander-in-chief of the fleet in Basque roads ; by which the French fleet, which had taken refuge under their own batteries, were driven on shore and deserted, and a considerable part of them destroyed on the 11th and 12th of April, 1809." On this resolution being put, a debate ensued; but the resolution was finally carried by a majority of 161 to 39.

The second resolution was, "That the thanks of this House be given to Rear-admiral the Honourable Robert Stopford, Captain Sir Harry Neale, captain of the fleet, and to the several officers and captains of the fleet under the command of Lord Gambier, for their gallant and highly meritorious conduct on that glorious occasion, particularly marked by the brilliant and unexampled successes of the difficult and perilous mode of attack by fire-ships, conducted under the immediate direction of Captain Lord Cochrane." The third resolution went to thank the seaman and marines of the fleet, for their meritorious and gallant conduct. These two resolutions passed unanimously. To the last, no objection could be urged ; but, with respect to the second, had the words " glorious", " brilliant", and " unexampled", been terms less hackneyed and deteriorated, the resolutions would not, we think, have passed as it did. At all events, had the House been aware that the officers, who staid with Admiral Lord Gambier in Basque road, had as little to do with the "perilous" as with the " gallant", measures which led to the whole of the success that ensued, the strong terms used would have been, if not exclusively, more pointedly addressed to Captain Lord Cochrane and the officers serving with him in Aix road.

But it was not on the British side only that blame was imputed for what had taken place in the neighbourhood of Basque roads. The captains of the Tonnerre, Tourville, Indienne, and Calcutta, were tried for alleged misconduct. The trial lasted from the 21st of June to the 8th of September, and led to the following sentences. Captain Clément de la Roncière was pronounced, by a majority of eight voices to one, not guilty of the loss of the Tonnerre, and was acquitted. Captain Lacaille, the court taking into consideration that he did not lose the Tourville, that he returned on board two hours after he had quitted her, and that he afterwards defended his ship against the enemy, and conducted her safe into port, was sentenced, by a majority of six voices to nine, to two years' imprisonment; to be erased from the list of officers, and degraded from the Legion of Honour. Captain Proteau was unanimously acquitted of the loss of his frigate; but the court, nevertheless, by a majority of five voices to four, condemned him to three months' confinement in his chamber, for having set fire to the Indienne without having previously acquainted the admiral of his intention. Captain Lafon was found guilty, by a majority of five voices to four, of having shamefully abandoned the Calcutta in the presence of the enemy, and was condemned to suffer death on board the admiral's ship, the Océan: a sentence which, at 4 p.m. on the following day, the 9th, was put in execution upon this unfortunate officer.

All the remarks, which we think it necessary to offer upon the trial of the French officers, may be comprised in a few words. Had the facts disclosed on that trial, respecting the actual position and defenceless state of several of the grounded ships, been known to the court-martial which sat upon, and honourably acquitted, Admiral Lord Gambier, the members would certainly have been better qualified to judge of the merits of the case submitted to their consideration ; but we cannot persuade ourselves that, even in that case, the court, composed as it was, would have pronounced a sentence more consonant to justice, and, as it would then in reality have been, " to the welfare of His Majesty's service."

We have looked into the account of the business of Basque Roads, as it stands in the work of a contemporary ; but the partiality, visible in every line of the few pages devoted to the subject, excites in us so much disgust, that we shall notice it no further than to mention, that the Jean-Bart, wrecked six weeks before the fireships were sent into Aix road, is declared to have been " lost on the Pallais shoal a few days after, in consequence of this attack ", and that, among the half a dozen captains, upon whom the writer bestows his commendation, is Captain "Prouse" or "Prowse", who was not present, nor even in command of a ship. * (* E. P. Brenton, The Naval history of Great Britain from the Year 1783-1822, London, 1836, Volume IV, p.287.)

We will now take a brief view of the state in which the fleet of M. Allemand was left, at Lord Gambier's departure from Basque roads. The Océan and Foudroyant were moored a full league up the river, and there lay aground ; the latter with only 26 of her guns on board, and the former with scarcely as many. The Océan was also in a very leaky and insecure state, from the opening of her seams by the straining she had previously undergone and was still suffering. The Cassard, Tourville, Régulus, and Patriote, with the three frigates, were at anchor of Rochefort, and were to remove back to the road of Aix, as soon as they could be supplied with guns and anchors from the imperial foundry, and from among those set apart for the ships on the stocks at Rochefort, consisting of two three-deckers, the Jéna and Ville-de-Vienne, and a 40-gun frigate. A fine 80-gun ship, the Triomphant, had recently been launched, and was fitting for sea.

To protect the anchorage of Aix, as soon as he should be in a state to return to it, M. Allemand had ordered the construction of a fresh boom, composed, in part, of the chains taken out of the wrecks of the fire-ships. There was also to be a second boom, within the principal one ; and both booms were to be protected by a numerous flotilla of heavy gun and mortar boats. By way of encouraging the sailors selected to man them, the Minister of Marine promised very high rewards to those who should board an enemy's armed vessel ; but, adds the French officer, whose excellent letters have been so useful to us, " it is first necessary to inspire our sailors with the spirit with which they were animated previous to this unfortunate affair. As it is, the greater part are completely disheartened : every day I hear them lamenting their situation, and speaking in praise of our enemies. This, in my opinion, is the greatest injury the English have done to us."

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